



**DILEMMAS OF MULTIPARTY PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY:  
THE CASE OF BRAZIL**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Focusing on the case of Brazil, this paper argues that the combination of presidentialism and a multiparty system has created difficult problems in the two (mostly) democratic periods of that country's history, 1946-64 and 1985-present. The situation of permanent minority presidentialism easily leads to executive/legislative stalemate resulting in political immobilism. Because of the rigid electoral timetable of the presidential system, there are no institutionalized means of dealing with this situation of presidents who lack stable congressional support. The extremely malleable character of Brazilian parties has exacerbated this problem. When presidents are popular, politicians of all stripes and colors support them, but when they lose favor, they often have difficulty winning support even in their own parties. Defections in hard times make it difficult for presidents to pursue coherent measures that could substantially redirect policy. Presidents have responded by trying to bypass parties and congress so that their most important programs will not be endangered by immobilism, congressional inaction, and the patronage designs of party politicians. Realizing that their base of support in any particular party is never entirely secure, they try to form broad multiparty coalitions through the distribution of patronage. Several presidents attempted to mobilize the masses as a means of offsetting their lack of institutional support, but doing so further weakened political institutions. Even with this panoply of measures, chief executives have had difficulties managing as minority presidents in a fragmented party system dominated by malleable parties. Although the empirical evidence is drawn from the Brazilian case, the paper argues that the combination of presidentialism and fragmented multipartism is generally problematic.

## **RESUMEN**

Concentrándose en el caso del Brasil, este trabajo argumenta que la combinación de presidencialismo con un sistema multipartidista ha creado serios problemas durante los dos períodos de (mayor) democracia en la historia de dicho país, de 1946 a 1964 y de 1985 hasta la fecha. Una situación de presidencialismo minoritario permanente conduce fácilmente a una parálisis en las relaciones entre ejecutivo y legislativo lo cual da como resultado el inmovilismo político. Debido al rígido calendario electoral del sistema presidencial, no existen medios institucionales para superar esta situación cuando los presidentes carecen de un apoyo estable del Congreso. El carácter extremadamente maleable de los partidos brasileños ha exacerbado este problema. Cuando los presidentes son populares, los políticos de todos los tipos y colores los apoyan, pero cuando caen en desgracia, muchas veces tienen dificultad en obtener apoyo, incluso dentro de sus propios partidos. La desertión en tiempos difíciles dificulta a los presidentes adoptar medidas coherentes que podrían reorientar substancialmente la política. Los presidentes han respondido tratando de pasar por alto a los partidos y al Congreso de tal manera que sus programas más importantes no puedan ser puestos en peligro por el inmovilismo, la inactividad del Congreso, y el clientelismo de los políticos de partido. Al darse cuenta de que su base de apoyo dentro de cualquier partido nunca se encuentra completamente asegurada, intentan formar amplias coaliciones multipartidistas mediante la distribución del clientelismo. Varios presidentes intentaron movilizar a las masas como medio para compensar su falta de apoyo institucional; sin embargo, esta práctica trajo como consecuencia el debilitamiento de las instituciones políticas. Incluso con esta panoplia de medidas, los primeros mandatarios han tenido dificultad para gobernar como presidentes minoritarios dentro de un sistema partidista fragmentado dominado por partidos maleables. Aunque la evidencia empírica se refiere al caso brasileño, el trabajo argumenta que la combinación de presidencialismo y multipartidismo fragmentado es problemática en general.

In the last few years, a number of analysts have addressed general problems or advantages of presidential and parliamentary systems.<sup>1</sup> Rather than addressing general problems or advantages of presidentialism, this paper looks at problems engendered by a subset of presidential systems, namely those with a fragmented party system. The paper argues that multiparty presidential democracy is difficult to sustain.<sup>2</sup> Focusing on the case of Brazil, the paper argues that the combination of presidentialism and a multiparty system has created problems for democratic stability in the two (mostly) democratic periods of that country's history, 1946-64 and 1985-present. In view of the increasing salience of institutional issues in Latin America today, and especially of the forthcoming (1993) plebiscite regarding Brazil's system of government, this is an especially timely moment to address these questions.

The argument proceeds as follows. Several features of the electoral system have encouraged the formation of a fragmented multiparty system in which the president's party almost never has a majority in congress. The situation of permanent minority presidentialism easily leads to an executive-legislative stalemate resulting in political immobilism (Mainwaring forthcoming). Because of the rigid electoral timetable of the presidential system, there are no institutionalized means of dealing with this situation of presidents who lack stable congressional support.

The extremely malleable character of Brazilian parties has exacerbated this problem. When presidents are popular, politicians of all stripes and colors support them, but when they lose favor, they often have difficulty winning support even in their own parties. Defections in hard times make it difficult for presidents to pursue coherent measures that could substantially redirect policy—exactly what is called for in periods of crisis.

Presidents have responded to this situation with a variety of practices. They often try to bypass parties and congress so that their most important programs will not be endangered by immobilism, congressional inaction, and the patronage designs of party politicians. Realizing that

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<sup>1</sup> See above all the seminal work by Linz 1991, which has circulated widely in unpublished form since 1985 and which helped spawn the subsequent debate. Other important contributions include Blondel and Suárez 1981; Linz and Valenzuela 1991; Shugart and Carey forthcoming; Coppedge 1988; González 1992; Riggs 1988; Suárez 1982. This literature has addressed a panoply of problems with presidential systems. Here I focus on the relationship between presidents, parties, and congress.

<sup>2</sup> As defined in this paper, a democracy must meet three criteria. (1) Competitive elections must afford the opportunity for alternation in power. (2) There must be nearly universal adult suffrage. Until recently, this criterion was debatable as some nations that were usually considered democracies excluded a large part of the adult population (e.g., Switzerland excluded women), but this is no longer the case. (3) There must be guarantees of classical civil rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of organization, due process of law, etc.

their base of support in any particular party—including their own—is never entirely secure, they try to form broad multiparty coalitions through the distribution of patronage. Several presidents—Vargas, Quadros, and Goulart—attempted to mobilize the masses as a means of offsetting their lack of institutional support, but doing so further weakened political institutions. Even with this panoply of measures, chief executives have had difficulties managing as minority presidents in a fragmented party system dominated by malleable parties. This institutional system has frustrated virtually all democratically elected presidents. It drove one president (Vargas) to suicide, led another (Quadros) to resign only seven months after winning a landslide victory, encouraged another (Goulart) to adopt erratic actions that contributed to the breakdown of democracy, and enabled an unpopular and inept president (Sarney) to complete his term despite lacking minimal conditions for facing a severe crisis.<sup>3</sup>

In brief, the combination of presidentialism, a fragmented multiparty system, and undisciplined parties has posed troublesome problems for the Brazilian political system. This combination has contributed to democratic instability, and has also contributed to the chronic weakness of Brazilian political parties.

At first blush, the difficulties of treating the 1946-64 and 1985-present periods together seem overwhelming. During these two time periods, society became more urban, industrial, and affluent; the electorate expanded greatly and became more educated; communication and transportation facilities improved greatly. Moreover, the economy was dynamic throughout most of the first period and has been disintegrating since 1985. However, in terms of political structures—a presidential system of government, an electoral system that encouraged fragmentation, and a multiparty system dominated by loose parties—there were important elements of continuity. The outstanding exception to this continuity in political structures took place during the short lived semi-presidential experiment of September 1961 to January 1963. Otherwise, the main difference between the two democratic periods in terms of political institutions is the change in format of presidential elections, from a single-round plurality to an absolute-majority format, with a runoff election among the two top finishers if nobody wins a majority in the first round. This change has encouraged a proliferation of presidential candidates and, as a result, has exacerbated the tendency towards fragmented multipartism even at the legislative level. But it has not radically altered the dynamics of the political system.

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<sup>3</sup> Sarney was not popularly elected nor was he elected in an unambiguously democratic process, having been chosen Vice-President in the 1985 electoral college that was intended to ensure the victory of the military regime's candidate. Nevertheless, he faced many of the same problems as the presidents of the 1945-64 regime.

## Minority Presidents and Executive-Legislative Deadlock

Presidents often had difficulty in securing stable support in congress because of the combination of a fragmented party system and undisciplined parties. This threefold combination made legislative-executive conflict and deadlock likely, if not on a consistent basis, at least during difficult times. The crux of the problem was that with the exception of Dutra, democratically elected Brazilian presidents have been minority presidents in terms of congressional support.

Tables 1 to 5 give results of presidential and congressional elections of the 1945-64 and 1985-90 periods. At the presidential level, Dutra alone received a majority in the popular tally, but Vargas and Quadros won huge pluralities and nearly got half of the votes. Before 1964 only Kubitschek, who won in a close race, failed to come close to a majority, and ironically, his presidency was the smoothest of all in the 1945-64 period. The problem was not lack of initial popular support for presidents, but rather an absence of stable congressional support. This was not a major issue during the 1946-51 period, since Dutra enjoyed majority backing in congress. But Vargas (1951-54), Quadros (1960-61), Goulart (1961-64), Sarney (1985-90), and Collor (1990-present) were minority presidents and lacked a stable base of congressional support.

The last column of Table 1 underscores the minority situation of the presidents' party. Leaving aside the anomalous Dutra period, when presidents assumed office, their parties had 16.8 percent (the PTB in 1951), 35.0 percent (the PSD in 1956), 21.5 percent (the UDN in 1961), and 20.2 percent (the PTB in 1961) of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and all lacked majorities in the Senate. For all practical purposes, Sarney's real party when he assumed the presidency in 1985 was the PFL,<sup>4</sup> which won only about 20 percent of the seats in the Chamber and had only 21 percent of the Senate seats after the 1986 elections. Most prime ministers outside the Commonwealth are from parties that have a minority of seats in parliament, but as I argue later in this paper, parliamentary systems are better equipped to deal with this situation.

The 1945 congressional results were an anomaly that do not affect the overwhelming tendency toward fragmented multipartism. This is both because of the unusual historical circumstances surrounding these elections and the electoral rules that were in place for them. The elections took place in a context of high continuity from the Estado Novo (M.C.C. de Souza 1976), leaving the newly formed PSD, which was created from the interstices of the Estado Novo, in a privileged position. None of the other parties had the resources to create organizations throughout the vast national territory.

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<sup>4</sup> In 1984, in order to run for Vice-President, Sarney was obligated by the extant electoral system to join Tancredo Neves's party, the PMDB. However, most of Sarney's close allies throughout his government, including his own son, were in the PFL.













In addition, the institutional arrangements that enabled the PSD to win a majority of congressional seats in 1945 were subsequently altered. The 1945 electoral law gave the largest party in each state all of the electoral remainders in the Chamber of Deputies, a system that amply favored the largest party, in most states the PSD. This method was subsequently altered after the 1945 congressional elections so that remainders were divided according to the largest remainder method of proportionality. This is the most proportional of all proportional methods (Lijphart 1986), so it became easier for small parties to obtain representation. Also, as occurs in most democracies, in 1945 coalitions were not allowed in proportional elections, diminishing the prospects of small parties. In 1945, presidential and congressional elections were held concurrently, and concurrent elections tend to produce better results for presidents' parties than midterm elections (Shugart 1988). Elections were held concurrently again in 1950, but after that the president had a five-year term and congress had a four-year term, so elections would have coincided only every twenty years.

The 1986 congressional elections were also anomalous in terms of the division of votes and seats. Two circumstances unduly favored the PMDB and limited party system fragmentation. These elections were the first in the new democratic period, and the PMDB benefitted by having led the party opposition to military rule. In addition, crass political manipulation of economic policy led to a short-term boom, followed by a horrendous bust after the election.

Table 6 specifies the high level of fragmentation in the Chamber of Deputies after 1950. By 1990, Brazil had one of the world's most fragmented party systems. Table 7 shows the Brazilian index of fragmentation in comparative perspective. The fragmented nature of the Brazilian party system can also be seen in Table 8, which shows comparative data on the percentage of seats won by the two largest parties in several democracies.

**TABLE 6**

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**Party Fragmentation in Brazilian Chamber of Deputies (in Seats)**

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1945	.64
1950	.76
1954	.76
1958	.78
1962	.78
1986	.65
1990	.88

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Source: Calculated from Tables 2 and 4.

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Several features of the electoral system produced a fragmented party system, which in turn made it unlikely that the president's party would enjoy a majority in congress, especially in the Chamber. In the Chamber, the system of proportional representation with a low state threshold, no national threshold whatsoever, and a high district magnitude made it easy for many parties to obtain seats, which also made it more difficult for any one party to have a majority.<sup>5</sup> Parties could form alliances in proportional elections, so a small party could win a seat with an infinitesimal percentage of the vote. The largest remainder method of proportionality made it easier for small parties to obtain representation. After 1950, the fact that presidential and congressional elections were not concurrent also encouraged the fragmentation of congressional seats.

Although it did not affect party system fragmentation or contribute to the likelihood that the president's party would have a minority, one other institutional arrangement added to the probability of executive-legislative conflict. Extreme overrepresentation in congress of the less populated states (Soares 1973) contrasted with a one-person, one-vote format for presidential elections. As a result, congress had a different social base from the president's, increasing the tendency towards conflict between the legislature and the executive (Furtado 1965).

The minority situation of the president's party has often led to difficulties and impasses in the relationship between the executive and legislature. By executive-legislative deadlock, I mean that the legislature and executive had reached a protracted impasse over some major issues; the president had difficulty in pushing his agenda through congress. Executive immobilism results when the president is rendered ineffective because of an executive-legislative deadlock. Not all deadlocks result in immobilism since the president may still be able to pursue policy goals outside of congress.

This is not the place for a detailed examination of executive-legislative relations during Brazil's periods of democracy. Enough has been written on this subject to make apparent the frequency of executive-legislative deadlock and immobilism (Abranches 1973; D'Araujo 1982; Franco 1976; Hippólito 1985; Santos 1986). Here a brief summary will suffice.

Executive immobilism and executive-legislative deadlock were not a major issue during the Dutra administration, in part because Dutra's political agenda was relatively modest, in part because the PSD enjoyed an absolute majority. But the problems started to emerge during the

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<sup>5</sup> Threshold refers to the minimum percentage of votes a party needs to win a seat. In Brazil, the formal threshold was the electoral quotient in any state, that is, the number of votes divided by the numbers of seats. If there were twenty-five seats in a state, a party or an alliance of parties would need four percent of the votes to attain one seat. There was no national threshold, so a party could obtain a seat with an extremely low percentage of the national vote. District magnitude refers to the number of seats per district. In Brazil, the states constituted the electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies. Each state was guaranteed at least seven deputies, and the large states had over twenty, a comparatively high district magnitude that facilitated representation of small parties. Several analysts (e.g., Shugart 1988) have noted that a district magnitude of five is the approximate point above which a large number of parties can attain representation.

Vargas administration. With the PTB breaking ranks on some vital issues, the PSD doing little to support Vargas in congress, and the UDN doing what it could to block Vargas's initiatives, the president had a difficult time with his programs in congress (Hippólito 1985: 90-103). Serious frictions between the president and the parties erupted in 1954, when Vargas, lacking support in congress and under siege by the UDN, committed suicide. The PSD watched on the sidelines, doing nothing to save Vargas, and even the PTB failed to come to his defense. D'Araujo (1982: 125,128) noted that Vargas was not immobilized by a lack of congressional support, but still concluded that the 1954 crisis must be analyzed partially in light of the difficult conflicts that emerged between the executive and the legislature in a multiparty presidential democracy.

Kubitschek also managed to avoid executive immobilism, and he had greater luck or skill in managing executive-legislative relations than Vargas. Among all of the democratic presidents of the post-1950 period, Kubitschek alone enjoyed stable support in congress, based on the PSD-PTB alliance with frequent support from other parties (Carvalho 1977; Santos 1986: 88-92). Nevertheless, by the end of his term Kubitschek no longer enjoyed such stable support and failed to accomplish a sweeping administrative reform because of congressional resistance. Convinced that the country's economic development required an efficient bureaucracy, Kubitschek, like Vargas before him, pressed for wholesale administrative reform. For decades, according to the dominant viewpoint of the time (Jaguaribe 1958), the bureaucracy had existed more to serve clientele than to provide public services. In the 1930s, Vargas had begun the drive to create a more efficient bureaucracy, but these efforts were incipient and in any case were partially undermined by Dutra's and congress's patronage largess. Both Vargas and Kubitschek pressed for reforms that would strengthen the merit system and protect state agencies from clientelistic pressures, but they were defeated by a congress unwilling to relinquish patronage privileges. Only in February 1957, after four years, did the bill proposing administrative reform even reach the floor of the house, and it ultimately went down to defeat (Lafer 1970: 73-112; Daland 1967).

With Quadros, executive-legislative deadlock began to translate into immobility. Even though Quadros's plans were not blocked by congress, he felt frustrated by the difficulties of working with congress. Quadros was incapable of winning the powerful mandate he longed for and resigned as a consequence on August 25, 1961, averring that unnamed evil forces were preventing him from accomplishing what he wanted to. The president's friends and foes alike refused to swallow that story and instead attributed the resignation to Quadros's desire to rule free of the institutional checks and balances that congress created (Carli 1962). Quadros had frequently stated that it was impossible to govern with congress, and his resignation was intended to produce a fervor of popular support that would result in strengthening the executive's power at the expense of congress.

A more flexible person than Quadros might have built coalitions in congress and accepted defeat when it came. In this sense, his frustration and resignation were not preordained, but rather represented the inconsequential action of an intemperate maverick. But the broader political system easily produced executive-legislative deadlock and encouraged anti-congress and anti-party attitudes on the part of presidents.

Concerned about Goulart's leftist proclivities, the military nearly blocked him from assuming the presidency and insisted that presidential powers be curbed. Congress consented and passed a constitutional amendment that instituted a semi-presidential system in September 1961. Frustrated by the limits that this system imposed, Goulart pressed for and got a plebiscite that restored full presidential powers in January 1963.

Goulart also became isolated, without a firm congressional base. The congress blocked or failed to approve many of his reform measures, and the executive became increasingly immobilized (Flynn 1978: 250-276). The PTB/PSD alliance had been a major pillar of the 1945-64 regime, but conservative PSD politicians became alarmed when Goulart shifted to the left. They refused to support Goulart's initiatives, leading to impasses in key policy areas, with agrarian reform being the outstanding case. Goulart's attempt to secure the nomination of San Tiago Dantas as Prime Minister in 1962 and his request for congressional approval of a state of siege in October 1963 were also vetoed by congress. His erratic style, indecisive action, and his failure to build institutional support by working with congress and the parties exacerbated the situation. Goulart responded with ad hoc measures and improvisation, but still failed to overcome executive paralysis. The sensation of immobilism plagued him as much as it had Quadros. Celso Furtado (1965: 158), one of Goulart's ministers, expressed the viewpoint of top decision-makers that "Any attempts at legislation designed to ease the institutional strait-jacket preserving the existing power system or to alter the distribution of income are nullified by the congress committees [sic]."

Goulart's poor leadership contributed to executive immobility, but immobility also resulted from the difficult situation of a president who lacked a stable majority in congress. As Santos (1986) has shown, congressional support became very unstable during the Goulart period. Santos (1986: 37-58) argued that the resulting decision-making paralysis was the central factor in the breakdown of democracy in 1964. The decision-making paralysis was reflected in a decrease in the number of laws approved by congress (Santos 1986: 44).

Sarney also experienced a dramatic erosion of congressional support towards the end of his term. After a series of government defeats in congress in 1989, one member of Sarney's loyal retinue admitted, "This is the end. Whenever there is a secret vote, the government can only



manage 31 votes (out of 570).”<sup>6</sup> Yet because of the rigidities of the presidential system, there were no means of replacing an inept president who was crippled by immobilism.

When impasses between the president and congress emerged, presidents often responded by making new cabinet appointments in an effort to solidify their support. Table 9 gives data on cabinet appointments between 1946 and 1964, underscoring the high turnover. The sharp increase in cabinet turnover during the Goulart years reflects the erosion of political stability.

### **Constitutional Powers and Limits of the Presidency**

The lack of reliable party-based congressional support created significant problems for presidents. Presidents either needed broad supra-party support or needed to circumvent congress in order to accomplish their agendas. Under these conditions, presidents often had a difficult time with policy implementation. To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to briefly examine constitutional powers and limits of the presidency.

At first blush, both the 1946 and 1988 constitutions appear to have bestowed formidable powers on Brazilian presidents. In the legislative arena, Brazilian presidents have had broader constitutional powers than American presidents. Indeed, Shugart and Carey (forthcoming) show that in comparative perspective the Brazilian presidency since 1988 has been particularly powerful in terms of constitutional powers in the legislative arena, and the 1988 constitution is similar on this score to the 1946 document. Both constitutions enabled the presidents to veto parts of a bill, in contrast to the U.S. constitution, which requires the president to approve or veto the entire bill. The partial veto gives Brazilian presidents greater ability to shape the legislative process. The 1946 constitution required a two-thirds majority of the jointly assembled congress to override a partial veto, and the 1988 constitution reduced presidential control by calling for a simple majority override.

The 1946 and 1988 constitutions both gave the president the right to initiate legislation; this is an exclusive right of congress in the U.S. Both Brazilian constitutions gave the president the exclusive right to initiate legislation in some policy areas. The 1988 constitution, for example, gave presidents exclusive rights to initiate the laws that determine the size of the armed forces; that create jobs, functions, or increase salaries in parts of the public-sector; that relate to the administrative and judicial organization, budgetary issues, and public sector workers in the country's Federal Territories; and that relate to a range of other specific domains. Both

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<sup>6</sup> Luis Eduardo Magalhães, quoted in “Salve-se Quem Puder,” *Istoé Senhor* No. 1033 (July 5, 1989), p. 25.



constitutions also granted decree powers to presidents, enabling them to implement some measures without congressional approval. The 1988 constitution allows presidents to adopt “provisional measures” (*medidas provisórias*), which enable presidents to implement measures that have the force of law for a thirty-day period without congressional approval. Finally, the Brazilian president has greater powers in the budget process than the U.S. president. The Brazilian president prepares the annual budget, and congress has some restrictions in the kinds of amendments it can propose. For example, congress is not permitted to include programs or projects not included in the president’s budget, nor is it permitted to authorize expenditures that would exceed the budgetary resources.

The only legislative process in which the Brazilian president is constitutionally weaker than the U.S. president is the package veto. To override a bill vetoed by the president, the U.S. congress requires a two-thirds majority in both houses of congress. In the 1988 Brazilian constitution, a majority of the jointly assembled congress suffices to override a package veto. Thus, rather than two qualified (two-thirds) majorities, a single absolute majority does the trick. In the 1946 constitution, an override required a two-thirds majority, but again of the jointly assembled congress, making an override formally easier than it is in the United States.

In terms of appointing and dismissing cabinet members, the constitutional powers of the Brazilian and U.S. presidents are similar, the only significant difference being that Brazilian appointments are not subject to senate approval. Both democratic constitutions gave the Brazilian president broad constitutional authority to intervene in state governments under exceptional circumstances, and the president can also proclaim a state of siege with congressional approval. These measures confer exceptional powers on the president, potentially greatly enhancing presidential powers.

Despite their formidable constitutional powers, presidents need congressional support to enact ordinary legislation, which is an important component of governing unless congress assents to other mechanisms that enable the president to bypass the legislature. Both constitutions restricted presidential decree powers to measures that enable the president to faithfully execute the laws. Decrees are not intended to be legislation, but rather regulation and administration within the parameters established by ordinary legislation. The “provisional measures” established in the 1988 constitution are supposed to be used only in cases of relevancy and urgency, and they obtain for only thirty days unless they are approved by congress. President Collor has made greater use of the “provisional measures” than was obviously intended, and in doing so, he has turned this mechanism into a means of achieving an imperial presidency, but with lamentable consequences in terms of institution building. Moreover, he quickly decided that attempting to govern as an imperial president without congressional support had high costs.

Thus, under normal circumstances, presidents need laws to govern, and to get laws passed they need the support of congress. It has been difficult for presidents to overcome congressional opposition and govern effectively when their popularity dissipates. This is why the presidents' lack of stable majority support in congress has presented problems for effective governance. And it is why presidents can have a hard time getting their agenda accomplished despite possessing seemingly formidable powers.

More than thirty years ago, at a time when the legislature was more compliant than it is today, Trigueiro (1959) published an article that drew attention to this problem. Trigueiro noted that the 1891 Brazilian constitution bestowed weak legislative authority on the president, but since there was in effect only one party,<sup>7</sup> which was dominated by the president, the president controlled the legislative process. Conversely, he observed, with ample constitutional legislative powers, presidents were sometimes at bay under the 1946 constitution. This problem became more acute after his percipient article was published, as party system fragmentation increased and as polarization became a defining feature of Brazilian party competition (Santos 1986). Presidents exercised greater control over the legislative process during the Old Republic (1889-1930) than during the 1945-64 period, even though their constitutional legislative powers were much greater in the later constitution. This suggests that however important the constitutional prerogatives of presidents and assemblies are, the nature of the party system and of the parties makes a great deal of difference in how presidentialism functions—and malfunctions.

### **Malleable Parties, Presidentialism, and Institutional Instability**

The undisciplined nature of Brazilian parties has added to the problems caused by the permanent minority situation of presidents' parties. Presidents could not even count on the support of their own parties, much less on that of the other parties that had helped elect them.

Brazilian parties in the two democratic periods have been undisciplined and incapable of providing consistent bloc support for presidents. State dissidences and defections of individual politicians have been tolerated by the parties, which have been incapable of imposing centralized discipline. Several studies of the 1945-64 regime have underscored the autonomy of state-level organizations *vis-à-vis* the national party, as well as the autonomy of individual politicians *vis-à-vis* both the state and national party organizations (Petersen 1962: 188-207; Lima 1983; Hippólito 1985: 119-133; L.L. Oliveira 1973; Benevides 1981: 160-171). As Petersen (1962: 202) noted,

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<sup>7</sup> Most states had their own local Republican Party, and none of these state organizations existed beyond that particular state. There were no national parties. But these state level organizations existed to support the president, and their leadership was generally at the president's beck and call.

"If there is a disagreement between national party orientation and state or personal interest the individual leader will normally place the latter first."<sup>8</sup> State party organizations were so important that the PSD had a federal structure; its national committee was formed by the presidents of all the state committees. At times, the PSD leadership of some states openly backed the presidential candidate of an opposition party. For example, in 1955 the party leadership of the states of Pernambuco and Rio Grande do Sul decided to back Juarez Távora of the PDC/UDN alliance against Juscelino Kubitschek of the PSD. The autonomy of state organizations was also suggested in the enormous interstate variations in electoral coalitions; a friend in one state was frequently a foe in the next (I.R. de Oliveira 1973; Soares 1964; Lima 1983).

Although some features of Brazilian politics have changed since 1964, the importance of state and local politics in determining how politicians and parties act has remained constant (Hagopian 1986; Sarles 1982). In the catch-all parties that still dominate electoral competition, politicians respond first and foremost to local and state interests, somewhat as they do in the U.S. (Mayhew 1974).

The autonomy of individual politicians to vote as they choose is reflected in the limited available data on party cohesion in congress, as Santos (1986: 92-109) showed for the 1961-64 period. Lack of party discipline continued to be a salient characteristic of the main parties in the period since 1985. Table 10 gives data on roll-call votes in the most important matters in the constitutional congress of 1987-88. The PT and PDT had very high levels of party cohesion, but the other parties suffered internal divisions, leading to major defections from the PMDB and PFL by 1988.

The autonomy of politicians with respect to parties was also reflected both from 1945-64 and since 1985 in the commonplace practice of switching parties. Politicians often switched parties because they failed to win nomination for a major position (candidate for governor or senator). Sometimes they ran on minor-party tickets, on which it was much easier to win space and which sometimes enabled candidates to win a seat with a lower vote, and then shortly after the election switched back to their original party. They may change affiliations to join the party of state governors, thereby gaining greater access to patronage opportunities. This lack of party cohesion accentuated the instability of presidential support and reinforced presidents' proclivities toward adopting ad hoc measures, circumventing congress, and making populist appeals to the population as a means of creating pressure on congress.

Presidents had one powerful weapon to keep members of their own party in line, namely, patronage resources, which enable politicians to deliver goods to their constituencies. But

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<sup>8</sup> This is also true of congressional representatives in the United States. See Mayhew 1974. But most Brazilian parties are even more malleable than the U.S. parties.



presidents' situations within their own party were weakened by their efforts to distance themselves from this party and by their status as lame ducks. A no-reelection rule meant that they were lame ducks from the day they assumed office (Coppedge 1988). Especially towards the end of their terms or in periods of fiscal austerity, they had difficulty maintaining control over their parties.

During the Vargas, Quadros, Goulart, and Sarney administrations, the major parties failed to define their positions *vis-à-vis* the government. They neither supported nor opposed the government, but rather opted for an ambiguous position and left the choice of supporting the government up to individual politicians.

None of the parties, including the PTB, clearly supported Vargas's government, nor, on the other hand, did any of the major parties except the UDN clearly oppose it. The PSD dominated Vargas's cabinet, yet the party maintained a dubious attitude toward the president, neither supporting nor opposing him (Hippólito 1985: 85-103). The parties were as ambivalent towards Vargas as he was toward them. D'Araujo (1982) argues that the crisis of Vargas's government was largely a product of his supra-party tendencies and the parallel lack of institutional support. Even though he included representatives of all of the major parties in his cabinet, Vargas could not rely on any of them for support in congress. Over time, Vargas's lack of institutional support led to the crisis that culminated in his suicide.

Under Quadros, the UDN, PSD, and PTB were all divided, with some factions of the parties supporting the president and others opposing him.<sup>9</sup> The UDN dominated the cabinet but much of the party began to oppose Quadros because of his foreign policy overtures to Cuba. The PTB, which opposed him during the campaign, began to support Quadros because of his independent foreign policy. There was no major opposition party in congress—a situation that also occurred during the first years of the Sarney and the Dutra governments.

By the brief Quadros interregnum, all three of the major parties were highly factionalized, making it all the more difficult to establish bases of solid institutional support (Franco 1976: 103-116; Ramos 1961: 21-95). The PTB was generally the most progressive of the major parties, and one faction of the party became more radical in the early 1960s. Still, the party had some conservative representatives and in a few states the conservatives dominated the party (Benevides 1989). The UDN was split between a moderate wing, led by Senator Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco and Governor Magalhães, and an intransigent right, spearheaded by Carlos Lacerda (Benevides 1981; Picaluga 1980). The PSD was generally a center-right party, but in the 1950s a more progressive faction known as the *Ala Moça* (Young Wing) emerged (Hippólito 1985: 139-186). A small group of only seven to nine deputies, the *Ala Moça* nevertheless assumed a

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<sup>9</sup> Afonso Arinos de Melo Franco was Quadros's Minister of Foreign Affairs. In his autobiography (Franco 1968: 54-164) he discusses UDN opposition to Quadros.

strong position within the party and pushed it to take more progressive positions. Then during the Goulart period, a new and more serious dissidence arose as party conservatives allied themselves with the UDN against the government (Hippólito 1985: 213-247; L.L. Oliveira 1973). The factionalism in the major parties contributed to a crisis of the party system (Ramos 1961: 21-95).

The parties started to be eclipsed by two supra-party fronts, the reformist Nationalistic Parliamentary Front and the conservative Parliamentary Democratic Alliance. In a remarkable indicator of the crisis of the party system and divisions within the parties, the Parliamentary Democratic Alliance included members of the UDN (41), PSD (32), PSP (5), PDC (4), PL (4), PRP (3), PTN (2), PR (2), and PTB (1).

Under Goulart, the UDN moved to the opposition, but a minority faction within the party supported some of Goulart's nationalistic program. The PSD was deeply divided, as some factions supported while others opposed Goulart (Hippólito 1985: 235-236). Only on March 10, 1964, three weeks before the coup, did the PSD finally come to a decision, opting for an official break with the government. Goulart's own party was split as some radicalized factions, led by Leonel Brizola, considered the president too timid.

A similar situation occurred with Sarney, who strove to assure himself of maximum autonomy with respect to the parties, which in turn generally maintained the ambiguous posturing that had characterized relationships between presidents and parties in the 1945-64 regime. When Sarney was immensely popular in 1986 because of the success of the Cruzado Plan, the economic plan that froze prices and wages, the PMDB and PFL were sycophantic. With the failure of the Cruzado Plan, however, both parties became deeply divided over their relationship to the government. Repeatedly the progressive sectors of the PMDB tried to push the party into defining its position with respect to the government, but they met invincible resistance. Conservative and clientelistic sectors continued to support the government, but in mid-1988 forty congressional representatives split off and formed a new party, the PSDB. Even among those who remained in the PMDB the schisms were deep. In the PFL, Marco Maciel led the splinter group that broke with the government, while most of the party continued to support it. During the constitutional congress of 1987-88, supra-party blocs once again eclipsed parties as means of organizing congressional debates.

The loose relationship between presidents and parties in Brazil has made politics more ad hoc, more personalistic, and less institutionalized. It has also contributed to the possibility of institutional deadlock and immobilism.<sup>10</sup> When presidents are popular, they generally dominate

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<sup>10</sup> Although the unpredictability of the congressional and party arena is heightened when parties are undisciplined, as in Brazil, disciplined parties are not an unqualified blessing in presidential systems. Especially in a multiparty presidential democracy, disciplined parties create



their parties,<sup>11</sup> and parties and politicians identify themselves with the government to enjoy the coattails of government prestige and to enhance their own access to patronage. When a president is unpopular, many politicians of the president's party distance themselves from him/her. Doing so not only is a means of avoiding the negative repercussions of identification with an unpopular lame-duck president, it also is a way that ambitious politicians have of trying to attain greater national projection: they can become leaders of a dissident faction in the party. The main glue (and it is a powerful one at times) that holds the president's support together is patronage—and this helps explain the pervasive use of patronage politics.

When they try to curb patronage and clientelism—however necessary doing so may be—presidents are likely to be abandoned. This situation has deleterious consequences for policy-making. Presidents often postpone unpopular measures, realizing they lack the support to enact them. As a result, necessary but unpopular reforms are postponed—sometimes indefinitely. Unpopular reforms are postponed in all political systems, but if the argument here is correct, this problem may be particularly acute in fragmented multiparty presidential systems.

Presidents had to seek support in other parties since their own parties did not have a majority that could ensure passage of major bills. Because the parties were extremely malleable, presidents could attempt to win a base by buying off the support of individual politicians from opposition parties. They did this by offering patronage positions and state resources to deputies, senators, and governors (who controlled state budgets and some federal monies) who supported them. Conversely, presidents and ministers withheld resources and positions from congressional representatives and governors who opposed them. This practice is very common in Brazil, as it also is in Ecuador (Conaghan 1992b).

This manner of creating a majority reverses what happens in a parliamentary system, as Deputy Raul Pilla, the leading Brazilian exponent of parliamentary government during the 1945-1964 period, once noted. Pilla wrote that "To avoid governmental paralysis, the President of the Republic, who was voted in by a minority of the electorate and has a minority in congress, needed to win the support of the largest opposition party. Rather than having the majority constitute the government (as in parliamentary systems), the government forms and fashions the indispensable majority, relying on the force it garners through its inexpugnable situation" (Franco and Pilla 1958: 348). The efforts of presidents, governors, and mayors to conquer the loyalties of members of

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different kinds of problems. Strong party discipline can accentuate impasses between the executive and congress, especially if the president faces a sizeable opposition in congress.

<sup>11</sup> De Riz (1988) makes a similar argument for the Argentine case during the Alfonsín period. While he enjoyed broad popularity, Alfonsín entirely eclipsed the Radical Party, but after his popularity eroded, schisms within the party emerged, and support within the party for Alfonsín declined.

opposition parties help explain the frequency of party switching in Brazil. Since many legislators depend on such resources to win reelection, this tool is powerful.

Patronage politics exist in all political systems, but the ubiquitous character of such practices in Brazil is distinctive. That such maneuvers can be effective is seen in how frequently politicians change parties to join whomever holds executive power. Unfortunately, in extreme cases such as the Sarney years, even if the president can manage to obtain a temporary majority, the effects on institution-building, public morality, and legitimacy can be pernicious.

### **Presidents Against Parties**

The difficulties of establishing a stable base of support in congress help explain why many presidents seem bent on acting against parties rather than acting through party channels. With a minority government—and most presidential democracies have minority governments most of the time—presidents often have difficulties pushing their agendas through congress and relying on party channels. In turn, Brazilian presidents have developed a supra- and anti-party tradition. This tradition can be seen as a “rational” response of presidents to the dilemmas they face, but it has contributed to the secular weakness of Brazilian political parties.

In many presidential systems, well-known and popular individuals can reach the presidency without having built their political careers through party organizations. The Brazilian case is extreme in this regard, with a host of supra- or anti-party presidents and major-party presidential candidates. Although there have been major differences from one president to the next, the Brazilian case is exceptional for the extent to which presidents have been recruited from outside or above party channels, have had an anti-party discourse, and have engaged in anti-party actions.

Formally, the parties of the 1945-64 period controlled presidential nominations; the national party organizations made the choices regarding presidential selection. There were no mechanisms similar to the U.S. primaries, in which presidential aspirants can appeal over the heads of the party organizations to the popular vote (Ceaser 1979). But in practice, party organizations were overshadowed by personalities. In order to better their chances of winning, parties frequently ran candidates who had not built their political careers through the party. The major parties ran several military leaders as their presidential candidates, and on other occasions ran politicians with notable anti-party orientations. Presidential candidates and presidents in office paid little or no heed to party platforms.

The number of military leaders who ran for president between 1945 and 1960 illustrates the extensive recruitment of individuals with no past party affiliations or experience in holding political office. In each of the four presidential elections, one or both of the top two vote-getters

were career officers who had no prior involvement with parties. It is difficult to find other democracies in which military leaders so dominated presidential candidacies.

Candidates' personalities often overshadowed party strength in presidential elections. The success of Vargas and Quadros in securing the presidential office indicates the extent to which strong linkages to parties were superfluous—and perhaps even prejudicial—to a politician's quest for executive office. Their victories represented a triumph of personal charisma over party organizations. In 1950, Vargas's PTB, which had only 16.8 percent of the seats in congress, opposed the largest two parties—and yet he came out an easy winner. Quadros's victory again demonstrated that a popular individual could take on the major parties and win. Opposed by the PSD, the PTB, and a panoply of smaller parties, Quadros nevertheless scored a smashing victory, winning 48 percent of the vote. The decisive importance of individuals over parties—at least for executive positions—was also manifest in the large number of split votes, as suggested by the fact that João Goulart, the PTB candidate, handily won the vice-presidency. Table 1 above showed that Vargas and Quadros defeated coalitions whose party support in the Chamber of Deputies was considerably weaker than that of their competitors.

Presidents and presidential candidates generally downplayed their connections to parties, striving for as much autonomy as possible. Campaigns emphasized personality, not issues, and relied on personal linkages more than on party organizations (Dubnic 1968). To be elected, candidates needed support from a wide range of the public, so a strong identification with a single party could be a liability.

Several major presidential contenders including four of the eventual winners—Dutra, Vargas, Quadros, and Collor—had weak connections to their parties and were known as anti-party men. Dutra had no past experience with parties except for having repressed them, as a career military officer who loyally served the Estado Novo. In his earlier stint as dictator, Vargas had abolished all political parties and dissolved congress in November 1937, averring that party democracy threatened national unity and that congress was an inadequate, costly apparatus (Skidmore 1967: 29). In 1945, realizing that his political future depended in part upon the existence of organized support, Vargas helped to create the PSD and the PTB. Nevertheless, he never entirely renounced his past as an anti-party politician. In the 1950 presidential campaign, he frequently reiterated that he considered himself a supra-party candidate. "I am not," he stated, "properly speaking a party candidate. I am above all the representative of the demands and aspirations of the popular masses, mobilized around a party label, around a name that for the masses constitutes the way, the direction, the program" (Vargas 1951: 172). At a later campaign stop, reminiscing about his accomplishments as president between 1930 and 1945, Vargas openly evinced his anti-party tendencies. "During my government, I attempted to ensure for the country a climate of political serenity...far from the uproar and the party passions that disrupt the

continuity of governmental action” (Vargas 1951: 348). Vargas relied heavily on direct appeals to the masses rather than party channels, and only infrequently did he ask for votes for PTB candidates.

Once elected, Vargas continued to prefer to deal above parties, as D’Araujo’s interesting study (1982) of his government has shown. The ex-dictator never thought in party terms; rather, he relied on his broad popular appeal and on improvising to offset his lack of institutional support. His supra-party style was apparent in the fact that his cabinet included members of the PTB and PSP, which had supported him in the campaign, as well as the PSD, which opposed him, and the UDN, which did everything possible to undermine him and even objected to letting him take office after his landslide victory (D’Araujo 1982: 71). His own party, the PTB, had only one minister in the initial cabinet.

Of the four elected presidents of the 1945-64 period, Kubitschek was the only exception to the line of anti-party presidents, but even he was ambivalent about parties once he achieved the presidency. In contrast to the other three elected presidents, Kubitschek was closely identified with one party—the PSD—through which he had built his political career. Before becoming president, he was very much part of the PSD, but during the campaign he began to distance himself somewhat from his party. This process continued when he was president. Kubitschek did not govern as a PSD leader, and he “made little effort to share his own prestige with the PSD during the peak years of his popularity” (Dubnic 1968: 51). Nor did he campaign for his party in the 1960 presidential election; in fact, he publicly suggested in October 1959 that UDN President Juraci Magalhães would be his best successor. Hippólito (1985: 187-212) has shown that Kubitschek worked actively to undermine the PSD’s prospects for the 1960 presidential race, calculating that his party’s electoral defeat would best serve his own prospects of regaining the presidency in 1965.

If Dutra and Vargas were moderately anti-party in orientation, Jânio Quadros had viscerally anti-party instincts. Quadros began his political career in 1947, when he was elected councillor (*vereador*) in the city of São Paulo on the PDC ticket, and three years, still with the same party, he was elected state deputy. In 1953 he was elected mayor of São Paulo, running on the PDC and PSB tickets, and in the following year, having been expelled from the PDC because of his anti-party tirades, he was elected governor of the state with the support of the PSB and PTN. In his campaign for governor, Quadros repeatedly reaffirmed his independence in relation to the parties. “I have no commitment to parties.... I have commitments only to the law and the collectivity” (quoted in Souza 1986: 69). In 1958, frustrated in his effort to secure the nomination to run for senate on the UDN ticket, Quadros switched to the PTB, on whose ticket he was elected federal deputy. His disdain for congress was such that after being elected, he went on a lengthy expedition to Europe and never bothered attending congressional sessions. Thus, he

had a lengthy history of switching from one party to another by 1959, when he began his campaign for president. Quadros had never been affiliated with the UDN, which nominated him as its candidate for president. In comparative terms, this is extraordinary; although there have been many supra-party presidents, including DeGaulle in France, Eisenhower in the United States, and Ibañez (1952-58) in Chile, it is difficult to find other presidents whose entire political career had been built through an opposing party. What makes this all the more remarkable is that just one year earlier, Quadros had run and won on the ticket of the UDN's archenemy, the PTB.<sup>12</sup>

Quadros's aversion to parties found expression throughout the campaign. In November 1959, in a ploy to avoid having to make concessions to the parties that supported him, he announced that he was withdrawing his candidacy. Victorious in this quest for greater autonomy *vis-à-vis* these parties, Quadros resumed his campaign, which was characterized by incessant anti-party rhetoric. He stated that "I have no commitments to the parties that support me.... The ideas that I sustain and I will sustain in my campaign are mine alone" (Santos and Monteiro n.d.: 150-151).

As followers of the U.S. scene are well aware, there is nothing exceptional about presidential candidates who run an "outsider's" campaign, appealing to citizens on the basis of their own distance from traditional ways of doing politics. It was not merely Quadros's status as a political outsider that makes him stand out. Rather, it was his constant anti-party rhetoric and actions. Quadros and his coterie created the Popular Movement Jânio Quadros, a nonpartisan base of support for his campaign. Remarkably, he himself did not belong to any of the parties, and during the 1960 campaign he tacitly supported João Goulart's candidacy for Vice-President, thereby undermining the UDN candidate. (The Vice-President was elected independently from the President at that time.)

It is not surprising that personalities were decisive in the 1945 election, before the parties had a chance to create a profile. What is noteworthy is that this situation had not changed by 1960; indeed, the 1960 presidential campaign was possibly the most personalistic and anti-party of all. Quadros's condescending attitude extended to the political class: "Professional politicians don't do anything except perturb Brazilian life" (Santos and Monteiro n.d.: 29). During his entire political career, Quadros presented himself as a moral crusader, above the sleaze of party politics.

Like Vargas, Quadros employed a supra-party style once elected. One observer wrote that Quadros hoped to "demoralize all the parties, divide them, and blame the congress for the difficulties of his administration" (Dubnic 1968: 47). In March 1961, his Minister of Justice said that Quadros was not even interested in working with congress because doing so might suggest

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<sup>12</sup> For a brief sketch of Quadros's political career, see Souza (1986). On Quadros's anti-party proclivities, see Ramos (1961: 21-45); Skidmore (1967); Flynn 1978: 207-225; Dubnic 1968: 102-111. For a brief treatment of his presidency, see Benevides 1982.

executive subordination to the legislature (Hippólito 1985: 109). In contrast to Vargas, who respected the rules of the political game despite his personalistic style, Quadros made no effort to cultivate the support of the parties.

Quadros continued the tradition of supra-party cabinets, including politicians from the UDN, PSD, PSB, PSP, PR, and PTB, but he had no intention of relying on or working through party channels. As had occurred with Vargas, this anti-party style led to serious institutional problems. Quadros alienated the main political parties, in part because of his invectives against congress and the parties. At its April 1961 congress, the UDN expressed euphoria about Quadros's victory, but the honeymoon was short lived. The UDN dominated the cabinet and had given the president most of his organizational support during the electoral campaign, but a key faction of the party began to oppose him. Renowned politician and editor Carlos Lacerda, who had enthusiastically backed Quadros's nomination and election, became an acerbic critic (Benevides 1981: 113-118; Skidmore 1967: 197-204). The PSD and PTB also split over supporting Quadros; some individuals supported Quadros while others opposed him.

After Vargas's suicide in 1954, João Goulart was the most prominent PTB politician, having served as Labor Minister under Vargas and having twice (1955 and 1960) won the Vice-Presidency. Like Kubitschek and in contrast to Dutra, Vargas, and Quadros, his political ascension was closely identified with a party. Goulart even served as national president of the PTB during much of the 1950s. Nevertheless, he was not known as a party man, but rather as a populist politician. In 1960, Goulart supported the committees working for the election of a Quadros-Goulart ticket, thereby undercutting allegiance to his own party. Though he did not follow in Quadros's path as a virulent party opponent, as president, Goulart failed to work through party channels. Rather than trying to win support for his policies in congress, he made appeals to the masses.

Since 1985, Sarney and Collor have carried on the tradition of anti-party presidents. Like Kubitschek and Goulart, Sarney had built his political career through party channels—the UDN before 1965, Arena from 1965 until 1979, and the PDS until 1984. In terms of his own political career before reaching the presidency, Sarney was possibly the president most identifiable as a loyal party person, having faithfully served Arena and the PDS in prominent positions—he was president of the party for several years. But once he assumed the presidency, Sarney reproduced many of the anti-party attitudes and practices of his predecessors and entered on a collision course with his official party, the PMDB.

Supported by a small party essentially created to enable him to run for the presidency, Collor has never been committed to parties. Throughout his political career, he flipfopped from the conservative pro-military Arena and the PDS to the PMDB, which opposed military rule, and

then the PRN. During his campaign he often criticized politicians and parties and tried to paint himself as a political outsider.

To a certain extent, presidents everywhere must represent and think about the nation more than their own parties. However, in some countries effective presidents were also often effective party builders. What is distinctive about the Brazilian case is not that presidents have faced the inevitable tension between being leaders of their nation and having connections to a party, but rather the extreme distancing of presidents with respect to their parties.

The question is why presidents have opted for supra- and anti-party tactics. In part, the answer may be attributed to the individual styles of the different presidents or to Brazil's anti-organizational political culture. An essential argument here, however, is that the combination of presidentialism, a fragmented multiparty system, and undisciplined parties has made it difficult for presidents to function through party channels and has encouraged anti-party practices. It is not only personalities and political culture, but also political structures that explain why presidents have acted against parties.

### **Presidential Politics and Party Coalitions**

In theory, presidents could create stable bases of congressional support by forming coalition governments. The argument in this section, however, is that presidential systems are generally unfavorable to stable coalition formation. This difficulty is compounded when parties are extremely undisciplined. Indeed, regardless of the system of government, party indiscipline is inimical to stable coalition-building. But *ceteris paribus*, there are differences between presidentialism and parliamentarism in terms of coalition-building.

Brazilian presidents have a long history of attempting to create majorities by forming broad coalitions. The search to form coalitions began during the pre-campaign phase, when presidential aspirants sought to win the endorsements of several parties. Before 1964, the plurality, single-round method of electing presidents served as an inducement to coalition candidacies.<sup>13</sup> Candidates needed to maximize votes even at the expense of overlooking party commitments, and this invariably entailed winning the support of several parties. Table 1 showed that the main presidential candidates always enjoyed multiparty support.

Presidents' efforts to build broad coalitions were not restricted to campaign periods. Presidents were aware of the difficulties of governing in a multiparty presidential democracy. They needed support beyond their own parties, so they offered patronage packages to a wide range of parties and congressional representatives. This patronage began at the peak level (cabinet

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<sup>13</sup> This is true generally and is not limited to Brazil. See Wright and Riker 1988; Duverger 1954.

positions and presidents of major public enterprises and executive agencies) and continued on down to minor appointments and favors in backwards towns and remote regions.

Oversized cabinets were a means of securing support from a wide range of parties—or rather, from individuals affiliated with a wide range of parties. Table 11 provides evidence of the consistent option of presidents to form multiparty cabinets.<sup>14</sup> If the parties represented in the cabinet had provided block support for presidents, they would have constituted an extremely broad alliance and presidents would have had great ease in securing stable majorities in congress. The last column of Table 11 gives the percentage of the vote obtained by the parties that had cabinet representatives. The parties that had cabinet positions often accounted for 80 percent of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and during the Quadros government, this figure reached 92.7 percent. Cabinet formation obviously did not obey the logic of minimal winning coalitions. With a multiparty presidential system with undisciplined parties, presidents needed friends in a broad range of parties to offset the unreliability of support in each of them.<sup>15</sup>

The breadth of the parties represented in the cabinet (to the extent that parties, rather than simply individuals, were represented), obeyed a logic closer to consociational than majoritarian democracy. Yet Brazilian democracy was not consociational, for although cabinet formation involved individuals from parties that constituted far more than a minimum winning coalition, it involved individuals and not party representatives. I will return to this point later.

Presidential efforts to win broad coalition support were often successful. As Santos (1986) and Carvalho (1977) have shown, the stability of Kubitschek's presidency was a function of broad multiparty support.<sup>16</sup> Carvalho studied 319 nominal votes in congress and found that the

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<sup>14</sup> Abranches (1988) argues that these multiparty cabinets were tantamount to coalition governments. I disagree because there was not always an agreement among the parties on the nature of coalition government. Presidents had considerable discretion in naming their cabinets.

<sup>15</sup> Not all party coalitions in congress were attributable to presidential initiatives. Electoral legislation and congressional rules also encouraged party coalitions at the legislative level. After 1946, Brazilian electoral legislation was (and is) unusual in allowing alliances in proportional elections, and the parties took advantage of this. Also, as Hippólito (1985: 61) notes, "By requiring qualified majorities for the presentation and voting of countless subjects, the constitution practically prevented a single party from approving any project. The law practically obligated parties to seek alliances." On congressional coalitions, see I.R. de Oliveira 1973; Santos 1986; Hippólito 1985: 64-75. On electoral coalitions for congress, see Soares 1964; I.R. de Oliveira 1973.

<sup>16</sup> Benevides (1981: 99-107) paints a different picture of the UDN's position during this period, emphasizing its intransigent opposition to Kubitschek.





coalitions responsible for approving measures were usually very broad, as is typically the case in most legislatures since most legislation is routine.

Over the years, however, forming a coalition to ensure congressional support proved increasingly problematic. When popular participation was still quite limited, ideological consensus in Brazilian politics was reasonably strong, making it possible to form moderately stable, informal coalitions. Between 1945 and 1964 there was an explosion of popular participation in politics, with a significant impact on the parties. Politics ceased being an elite game and elite consensus eroded, and along with it so did the facility of forming these broad coalitions.

The presidential system has contributed to the difficulties in coalition-building. Coalition formation is generally more problematic in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems,<sup>17</sup> above all because the primary prize in a presidential system—the presidency—is nondivisible and is established for a fixed time period. Because of several other features of presidentialism, coalitions to support a candidate in a presidential election usually do not imply as stable a base of legislative support as coalitions to form a government in a parliamentary system. Nor does the inclusion of a party in the cabinet have the same significance in a presidential system—especially one with extremely malleable parties—as it does in a parliamentary system.

A multiparty agreement to form a government in a parliamentary system differs in three ways from an agreement among several parties to support a presidential candidate during the campaign or a president's decision to include leaders of several parties in the cabinet. First, in a parliamentary system, the parties forming the government choose the cabinet and the prime minister. In presidential systems the responsibility of putting together a cabinet rests primarily with the president rather than the parties. The president may have made prior deals with the parties that support him or her, but these deals are usually not as binding as they are in a parliamentary system. Presidents are generally freer to dismiss ministers and rearrange the cabinet than prime ministers are. This presidential autonomy is part of a generally looser institutional arrangement that can easily lead to a lack of stable congressional support, for just as presidents are less bound to the parties, so are the parties less bound to the presidents.

In Brazil, presidential autonomy in forming cabinets is reflected in the limited correlation between which parties supported presidents during campaigns and the number of cabinet appointments allocated to the parties. Table 12 makes this point clear, with Vargas's cabinet being especially notable in this regard. Having run one of the main candidates opposing Vargas, the PSD wound up with the lion's share (five of eight) of civilian cabinet posts. The UDN, which trenchantly opposed Vargas, gained as many ministries (one) as Vargas's own PTB. Moreover, as Table 9 showed, presidents changed the composition of cabinets with frequency. Changes in

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<sup>17</sup> Lijphart 1992 arrives at a similar conclusion, though through somewhat different arguments.

cabinets usually were the president's decision and were not brought about by party decisions. For example, having been elected with the support of the PSD and PTB, Dutra later excluded the latter from his cabinet and included the UDN, which had been his foremost opponent in the 1945 election.

**TABLE 12**

<b>President</b>	<b>Presidential Election Coalition</b>	<b>Initial Cabinet Composition*</b>
Dutra	PSD, PTB	PSD(5), PTB (1)
Vargas	PTB, PSP	PSD(5), UDN (1), PTB (1), PSP (1)
Kubitschek	PSD, PTB	PSD (4), PTB (2), PSP (1), PR (1)
Quadros	UDN, PDC, PL, PTN	UDN (3), PTB (3), PSD (1), PSP (1), PR (1), PSB (1)
Collor (second round)	PRN, PDS, PFL, PTB	PMDB, PFL, PRN

\* The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of cabinet positions allocated to different parties.

Source: Lúcia Hippólito, *PSD: De Raposas e Reformistas* (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985), pp. 293-303; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

The second major difference between party coalitions in presidential and parliamentary systems is that in the latter, individual legislators are more or less bound to support the government unless their party decides to drop out of the governmental alliance. MPs risk losing their seats in new elections if they fail to support the government. In presidential systems, the commitment of individual legislators to vote the party line varies a great deal, ranging from the extremely cohesive congressional parties in Venezuela to the extremely undisciplined catch all parties in Brazil and Ecuador. Consequently, it is impossible to generalize about what party support for a government implies in terms of individual congressional representatives' positions. In Venezuela, when a party supports the government, its representatives in congress consistently vote with the government (Coppedge 1988). In Brazil, however, the catch all parties rarely have party positions, but instead let individual legislators vote as they choose. It is not uncommon for a government to have a cabinet member from a particular party, only to face the opposition of most members of that party in congress.

The federal component of Brazilian politics also undermined the commitment assumed by a party to a president when the latter offered cabinet posts to members of that party. Party decisions and processes were influenced more by state than national issues. Following the logic of state politics, state party organizations frequently adopted a line contrary to the dominant position of the national leaders. When a president offered a ministerial position to a party member, it sometimes was a friendly gesture towards the party of a particular state, but a hostile gesture in relation to the national-level organization. For example, Quadros scorned the PSD, but still offered one cabinet position to a PSD leader from Rio Grande do Sul, which had supported him in the 1960 election, countering the orientation of the national leadership.

A few examples underscore that a politician's participation in the cabinet was sometimes dissociated from his or her party's positions. As President in the 1950s, Getúlio Vargas included a cabinet member from the UDN, which did everything it could to undermine his government. This UDN minister did not even try to persuade his party to support the government. Rather than applauding Vargas's decision to include a UDN representative in his cabinet, UDN leaders viewed this act with suspicion (Hippólito 1985: 92). Vargas's cabinet was dominated by the PSD, which maintained a dubious attitude toward the president. The PSD cabinet members were not named by the party, but rather on the basis of regional criteria or personal friendship (Hippólito 1985: 91). Quadros's cabinet included one politician from the PSD, which generally was at best ambivalent about the maverick president. Goulart's cabinet also had a UDN member, notwithstanding this party's concerted effort to undermine the president. The PSD, which was ambivalent toward Goulart, was represented in all of his cabinets. Sarney's cabinet included many representatives from the PMDB, which was ambivalent about his government. In brief, cabinet representation implies little about whether the congressional representatives of that party support the government.

This dissociation between party affiliations of cabinet members and party coalitions poses troublesome issues about how to define the notion of minority governments in presidential systems. In parliamentary systems, minority governments are those in which the party or parties that support the government have a minority in parliament. In multiparty presidential systems, especially with malleable parties, there is no obvious criterion for determining whether a party supports the government. Whether or not a party is allocated a cabinet position is not always relevant, for it may be an individual rather than the party that has the position, and the majority of the party may oppose the government. This situation further underscores the unstable basis of congressional support for government policy.

The third major difference between party coalitions in presidential and parliamentary systems is that in the latter, the parties themselves are coresponsible for governing and are committed to supporting governmental policy. When they cease supporting the government,

there is a chance that new elections will be called in most parliamentary systems. Moreover, it is likely that the potential of early elections affects parties' calculations in deciding whether to support a government. The coalition that brings the parties together is binding for the post-election period. Along with the two previously mentioned factors, this measure helps ensure that there will either be stable parliamentary support for the executive or a means of toppling the government.

Whereas in parliamentary systems, party coalitions take place after the election and are binding, in presidential systems, they usually take place before the election and often are not binding past election day.<sup>18</sup> Given the separation of powers, an agreement among parties may pertain only to congressional matters, with no binding implication for relations between the parties and the president. Several parties may support the president during the electoral campaign, but this does not ensure their support once he or she assumes office. Even though members of several parties often participate in cabinets, the parties are not responsible for the government. Parties or the majority of party representatives can join the opposition without bringing down the government. Since the only means of replacing the executive is impeachment, it is theoretically possible for an executive to end his or her term with no support in congress. These problems are particularly acute with weak parties.

### **Presidential Efforts to Bypass Congress**

If presidents cannot get legislators to go along with their programs, they may try to bypass the legislature through a variety of means permitted by the constitution: declaring a state of siege or some other extraordinary measure that allows them to govern without congressional support, using executive decrees, seeking a constitutional reform to broaden their powers, relying on the armed forces to govern in the absence of stable congressional support, or encouraging popular mobilization as a means of pressuring congress into supporting presidential programs. These constitutional mechanisms for bypassing congress, as well as many unconstitutional ones, have been commonly employed by Latin American presidents. But contrary to some interpretations, these mechanisms do not usually allow democratic presidents to govern as semi-dictators.

In dealing with the problems created by the combination of presidentialism, a fragmented party system, and malleable parties, one of the predominant strategies used by all of Brazil's democratic presidents was to bypass congress by implementing policy through executive agencies and decrees. Vargas and Kubitschek were particularly skillful at this practice. As

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<sup>18</sup> There are occasional exceptions. For example, the National Front coalition in Colombia lasted for sixteen years (1958-1974), during which interparty coalitions stuck together for the entire presidential period.

D'Araujo (1982), Benevides (1976), Lafer (1970), Nunes (1984), and Geddes (1986) have argued, the major successes of their administrations can be credited to their ability to circumvent congress and parties without alienating these institutional pillars. Both presidents had ambitious goals for modernizing their nation, and neither was willing to submit their ambitious agendas to the vicissitudes of a congress notorious for slow deliberations and indecisive action. Both believed that an effective bureaucracy was an indispensable tool in realizing their goals, and as a result attempted to promote broad civil-service reform. Doing so, however, proved difficult: clientelistic congressional representatives blocked reform, preventing presidents from implementing broader changes in the bureaucracy.

Given this situation, both presidents opted for creating dynamic new nuclei within the public administration, thereby circumventing the clientelistic vested interests that blocked administrative reform. Rather than relying on party and congressional channels, Vargas generally attempted to accomplish his program of government through state agencies. Most of the important programs of his administration went through state agencies rather than parties and congress. In part, this was because of Vargas's own supra-party instincts, but it was also because the lack of a stable basis of party support led him to bypass congress in efforts to achieve administrative efficiency. Through various executive agencies, Vargas achieved a dynamic administration, but his supra-party style in turn delegitimated parties and impeded party-building. The Vargas government pursued a supraparty behavior and delegitimated political organizations, precisely because of its distrust in institutions and of the absence of an institutionally based political proposal" (D'Araujo 1982: 137).

Kubitschek's most important projects largely circumvented congress and the parties and instead were implemented through executive agencies. In pursuing his most important policy objectives through new administrative structures, Kubitschek followed Vargas; he differed from Vargas in maintaining intact the PTB/PSD alliance. Kubitschek followed Vargas's lead in designing new administrative organs to create an efficient nucleus within the state apparatus. He relied extensively on the so-called Executive Groups to carry out development planning and projects. Although he sent the general outlines of his development plan through congress, he carefully insulated the Executive Groups from clientelistic pressures. The idea was to concentrate expertise in and insulate those agencies which were crucial for plan implementation (Lafer 1970; Benevides 1976: 199-244; Nunes 1984: 131-177; Geddes 1986: 75-139; Mello e Souza 1968). Benevides (1976: 224) notes that this "parallel administration" was a means of "avoiding immobilism without having to radically contest the system." Some privileged organs became the administrative means for implementing new programs, while the traditional bureaucracy remained a redoubt of clientelism and patronage politics.

The skillful combination of allowing some clientelistic mechanisms so as to build institutional support and finding means of creating bureaucratic efficiency made Kubitschek's government the most successful of the 1945-64 regime. Several authors (Lafer 1970; Leff 1968; Nunes 1984; Geddes 1986) agree with Benevides (1981: 225-226) that "the realization of the Target Plan would never have been possible if it had had to be through the traditional legislative channels." Kubitschek's success was facilitated by his decision to leave intact major areas of the bureaucracy and instead concentrate on creating (generally new) dynamic nuclei within the state apparatus. He realized that sweeping administrative reform was politically unfeasible, and that the only means of energizing the state apparatus was through creating new agencies.

However, these mechanisms of bypassing congress require legislative assent. When presidents have such assent, they can use bureaucratic agencies to implement policies, thereby prescinding the normal law-making process. But if congress actively opposes executive initiatives, it is difficult for presidents to bypass the legislature by using bureaucratic channels. For example, Goulart could not have implemented an agrarian reform through extralegislative channels because of congressional opposition. Both Quadros and Goulart attempted to bypass congress to implement their policies, but they largely failed at doing so.

Moreover, even when it is done most successfully, as was the case with Kubitschek, creating new agencies to circumvent congress can have political, economic, and administrative costs. Making congress an arena where only issues of secondary importance and patronage questions are resolved undermines spaces of institutional dialogue and compromise. Ultimately, this practice can weaken mechanisms of accountability in the system, as well as undermine the capacity of congressional representatives to decide major policy questions. Where the bureaucracy decides questions that are usually under congressional jurisdiction, the representative nature of the system can erode. In addition, as Max Weber (1978: 1392) argued, where legislatures are reduced to bodies of secondary importance in policy terms, there is a strong incentive towards the formation of a less responsible political class.

The economic consequences of pursuing policy through executive agencies can also be deleterious. Because extant bureaucratic structures are often perceived as a domain for patronage politics or are dominated by bureaucrats sympathetic to past administrations, presidents may decide that they cannot use these agencies and consequently often create new agencies. This formula can lead to constant expansion of the state apparatus with no consideration for efficiency and productivity. The presidency ultimately becomes overburdened, and there are no effective means of overseeing the entire administrative apparatus under the executive branch. It is arguable—although this hypothesis cannot be fully explored here—that the crises of the Latin American economies in the 1980s are in part a result of such hypertrophy of the state.

Three presidents—Vargas, Quadros, and Goulart—attempted to mobilize the masses as a means of offsetting their lack of stable congressional support. When Quadros and Goulart were frustrated with congress, rather than negotiating with the parties they appealed to popular mobilization—with disastrous results in both cases. Frustrated by the difficulties of working within the institutional system, Goulart increasingly turned to popular mobilization as a means of winning support for his policies. In 1964, he planned a series of mass demonstrations that would show support for his policies. This strategy was catastrophic, as it further alienated major actors, including the armed forces; Stepan (1978) and Skidmore (1967) saw it as a decisive step in the breakdown of democracy. The military and many conservatives saw Goulart's moves as an indication of his willingness to break the constitution to achieve his own goals.

Presidents have also often relied on the military to offset the lack of stable support in congress. Whenever his programs were threatened by congressional resistance, Sarney turned to the military. Similarly, when he disagreed with congressional actions, Sarney often used the threat of military discontent to try to impose his own viewpoint.

## **Conclusions**

This paper has addressed a range of problems in the relationship between presidents and parties. In the conclusions, I look at three issues: the strengths and weaknesses of democratic presidents, the impact of presidentialism upon party building, and the difficulty of developing stable democracy with the combination of presidentialism and a fragmented multiparty system.

Most of the literature on Latin American presidentialism has emphasized how powerful presidents are. This paper suggests that this argument is partially misleading. As I have noted elsewhere (Mainwaring 1990), most of this literature failed to distinguish between presidents in democratic situations and those in authoritarian situations. If we examine the democratic settings more closely, a complex pattern emerges, but on balance the weaknesses of most presidents stand out. Presidents have some spheres of exceptional powers, but often have trouble pushing through major parts of their policy agenda. This characterization applies to several Brazilian presidents, above all Quadros, Goulart, Sarney, and increasingly Collor, i.e., to all the more recent democratic presidents. The frequent laments of Brazilian presidents about their inability to do what they want because of congressional constraints corresponds to a reality despite the fact that both the 1946 and 1988 constitutions bestowed ample formal powers on the president.

The corollary is that the Brazilian congress was an important actor during the 1946-64 regime, as it has once again become with the promulgation of the 1988 constitution (Abranches 1973, Abranches and Soares 1972, Ames 1987: 101-210, Souza 1976, Santos 1986).



Congress's role has been predicated more upon blocking and moderating presidential action than upon becoming an effective agent of legislation. Trigueiro (1959: 45) noted that between September 1946 and December 1958, Congress approved 3520 laws that it had initiated, compared to 23,288 executive decrees.<sup>19</sup> In his observation, most of the laws initiated in congress were of secondary importance, leading Trigueiro to conclude that congress was incapacitated for elaborating laws.<sup>20</sup> This helps explain the frequency of criticisms regarding congressional inefficiency (Abranches and Soares 1972; Franco 1965: 52-53; Furtado 1965; Packenham).

Although political scientists (e.g., Lambert 1969) have often assumed that presidential systems provide the strongest executive leadership, the Latin American record suggests otherwise (Brito 1967; Franco 1965: 147-167; Suárez 1982). Most often, the presidential role is marked by deep ambivalence and ambiguity (Blondel and Suárez 1981; Hartlyn 1991; Suárez 1982). On the one hand, most of the power to act through elected channels is concentrated in the presidency. Aware of the dangers of protracted immobilism, constitutions have granted most Latin American presidents powers that exceed those of the U.S. president. Some Latin American presidents have decree powers that give them broader legislative authority than the U.S. president has. Many Latin American presidents have the constitutional right to impose states of siege that dramatically curtail the system of checks and balances. Presidents generally have greater patronage powers in Latin American than in the U.S. Finally, a few Latin American constitutions, including the Brazilian constitutions of 1946 and 1988, enable presidents to veto parts of a bill, in contrast to the U.S. constitution, which provides only for vetoing an entire bill.

On the other hand, fear about abuse of presidential authority has led constitution makers to seek a multitude of ways to limit presidential abuse (Kantor 1977). Most Latin American democracies (the exceptions being the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua) prohibit the immediate reelection of the president. Constitution makers feared that longer presidential tenures would lead to abuse of power. Most constitutions, including the Brazilian, established bicameral legislatures as a means of creating checks on presidential power. A few, once again including the Brazilian, also established a federal system. In some countries, the legislature has the right to interpellate cabinet members, and in Peru it can even dismiss them.

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<sup>19</sup> In comparative terms, the dominance of the executive in initiating legislation is not uncommon. According to Schwarz and Shaw (1976: 199), in Britain 77 percent of all adopted bills were initiated by the executive. Corresponding figures were 76 percent for West Germany between 1949 and 1969 and 93 percent for France between 1961 and 1966.

<sup>20</sup> This situation underscores a commonplace dilemma in Latin America. Strong congresses may help immobilize the system as a whole if the opposition controls one or both houses of congress—which means most of the time. In a presidential system, measures that weaken congress directly weaken the arena where parties often enjoy the most political clout.

This ambivalence about the president's role helps explain the frequent struggles to constitutionally redefine presidential powers. Presidents often seek constitutional reforms so that they have broader powers. Frustrated by the difficulties of getting measures through congress, every Chilean president from Alessandri to Allende either attempted to bypass congress or to reform the constitution to broaden executive power. President Frei (1964-1970) ultimately succeeded at the latter, but as Valenzuela and Wilde (1979) note, the cost was high: the erosion of spaces of negotiation and compromise. Similar problems of immobilism led to constitutional reforms that enhanced presidential powers in Colombia in 1968 (Hartlyn forthcoming) and Uruguay in 1967. The Uruguayan constitution was changed five times between 1918 and 1967, and the fundamental controversy involved the nature of executive power (Edelmann 1969b; Gillespie forthcoming). In the same vein, frustrated by the lack of congressional support, Goulart said in a March 15, 1964, speech that he wanted a constitutional reform that would expand his powers.

Most of these constitutional debates have failed to see that the nature of the party and electoral systems, as much as the constitutional prerogatives of presidents, accounts for the frequent difficulties presidents have faced in accomplishing their agendas. In cases like the Brazilian, where presidents' parties almost never enjoy a majority in congress and where party indiscipline is rampant, congress can block presidential initiatives. The problem is that when congress blocks the president, an impasse easily results, with both congress and the president debilitated in the process.

In light of the U.S. experience, it is not surprising that presidents are often weaker executives than prime ministers. The presidential system was designed to grant only weak powers, and was predicated upon an intricate set of checks and balances. As Burns (1963: 8-23), Dahl (1956), Huntington (1968: 109-133), and Lipset (1963) have argued, early American political leaders were suspicious of and hostile to concentration of powers. They feared royal absolutism and designed a constitution intended to ensure that the executive would not be an autocrat. Only in the twentieth century in the face of overpowering administrative exigencies were presidential powers vastly expanded (Arnold 1986).

Presidential systems are not designed to engender decisive executive leadership, but rather to encourage the dispersion of power. But the lack of decisive yet democratically exercised executive leadership has often created conundrums. Most presidential systems totter between too many checks on presidential powers, leading to immobilism, and too few checks, generating autocracy. In this light, the chronic battles over the constitutional powers of presidents are not surprising. Presidents feel that they need greater powers to accomplish their objectives, but legislators, usually already at the margin of the decision-making process, fear oblivion.

While presidents typically have considerable difficulty implementing their programs, they have enormous—and ever growing—responsibilities. Latin American presidents must administer huge, complex state bureaucracies. Yet most democratic presidents are constantly engaged in cultivating public support, hence they have less actual time to oversee administrative activities than do prime ministers (Rose 1981). The gap between demands on and capabilities of the presidency has grown in recent years as a result of the severe economic crises of the 1980s. The economic crises have led to closed, technocratic decision-making within the executive branch, and congress has been excluded from economic policy-making (Conaghan 1992a). But presidential capacity to handle these crises has eroded.

The problems of democratically elected presidents have helped justify coups that promote the hypertrophy of the executive and the emasculation—if not the abolition—of congress. Having witnessed the difficulties of democratic presidents in realizing their agendas, the Brazilian military regime proceeded to change the institutional context so that the president could govern without checks and balances. One of the military's very first measures, Institutional Act No. 1, published only a week after the coup, greatly expanded executive power and limited congressional jurisdiction. Subsequent constitutional reforms further strengthened the executive and weakened congress (Alves 1985: 31-100; Diniz 1984: 324-373).

It is precisely because of their difficulties in accomplishing their agendas with congressional support that presidents circumvent congress, create new executive agencies, distribute patronage to win the favor of some politicians, attempt to enact constitutional reforms to expand their powers, and try to undermine congress and parties so that they can get their way. These proclivities of Latin American presidents have sometimes been treated as expressions of an Iberic political culture. The Iberic political culture may have contributed to presidential quests for power, but it is equally important to look at the institutional incentives that shape presidential behavior. Unlike most prime ministers, they cannot dissolve congress and call new elections. Unlike all prime ministers, they are sitting ducks—more than lame ducks—if congressional support abandons them. In some countries, in contrast to prime ministers, they cannot even count on the support of their own parties, if they have one. The personal leadership styles of presidents vary considerably, and not all presidents address these dilemmas in the same fashion. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to see presidential quests for power and presidents' efforts to bypass congress and undermine parties simply as an expression of their own personal idiosyncrasies. The situation of minority presidentialism creates dilemmas that underlie such actions.

The second issue I wish to raise in the conclusions is the impact of the presidentialism on party-building in Brazil.<sup>21</sup> Whether a system is parliamentary, presidential, or semi-presidential

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<sup>21</sup> In framing the question in this fashion, I do not intend to suggest that the system of government is an independent variable that determines, or influences in a unilinear fashion, the

shapes the nature of parties and party systems. In Brazil, the presidential system has generally worked to weaken parties for several reasons.

Brazilian presidentialism has proven inimical to party-building because presidents have felt obliged to undercut parties and congress. Presidents have had incentives to assume anti-party and anti-congress behavior. When presidents had a distinct minority in congress, they were almost obliged to seek supra-party support and to circumvent congress. As was observed earlier, Brazilian presidents have cultivated a supra-party style. This is true even of individuals who had built their political careers through the party organization. The fact that presidents distance themselves from rather than rely on parties has also had a deleterious effect on party-building.

Although the anti-party campaigns and presidents found in Brazil were not an inevitable result of presidentialism, only in a presidential system could such anti-party individuals have assumed the chief executive office. In Brazil, as in most presidential systems, the popular vote determines how executive power is formed. Winning the presidency has not depended upon parties as much as upon individual politicians, whose personal campaigns, followings, resources, and organizations are more significant than those of the parties. This is true in many presidential systems; Burns (1963) argued that in the U.S. presidential autonomy *vis-à-vis* their parties is so great that there is essentially a four-party system: the Presidential Republican Party, the Presidential Democratic Party, the Congressional Republican Party, and the Congressional Democratic Party.<sup>22</sup>

The autonomy of Brazilian presidents with respect to their parties is unheard of in parliamentary systems. Prime ministers are directly tied to their parties; they are not elected by popular vote; and they have necessarily had lengthy careers in the parties, culminating in their selections as party leaders. Because parties monopolize channels of political recruitment for prime ministers, the chief executives in parliamentary systems invariably have a past deeply intertwined with the party organization. And once the prime minister is elected, his or her term of office is not fixed, but rather depends upon the ongoing support of a party or coalition of parties. Implementing major policy decisions without the support of the parties is almost impossible. Both

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nature of parties and the party system. The nature of the parties and the party system also influences the system of government. Duverger (1984) provided concrete support for this argument, showing that in France, the introduction of presidentialism thoroughly revamped the party system, but that in Iceland, Ireland, and Austria, the previously existing parties and party systems transformed the nature of presidentialism. But the fact that the influence between party systems and the system of government is reciprocal does not prevent us from looking at one side of the influence, *viz.*, the impact of presidentialism on party-building. Moreover, in most countries the system of government historically antecedes the consolidation of party systems. Therefore, the system of government often initially conditioned party development more than vice versa.

<sup>22</sup> Though his argument exaggerates the point, Burns does call attention to the autonomy of presidents *vis-à-vis* their parties. Rose (1981) makes a broadly similar point from a different perspective.

because of their past socialization in party organizations and because of their present needs, prime ministers have a deep stake in party-building.

Because they are elected by popular vote or by an electoral college whose composition is determined by the popular vote, presidents do not always have a strong stake in party-building, and they frequently have limited congressional experience. Presidents often enjoy an independence from the political parties that is unknown in parliamentary regimes. They may have limited experience as party people (Rose 1981; Suárez 1982: 131-137; King 1975), and may even run against the parties, as individuals “above” professional politicians. Such diverse cases as Eisenhower in the United States, Vargas and Quadros in Brazil, and Perón in Argentina illustrate the point. Depending on the candidate-selection process, they can win office despite the opposition of most party professionals. Brazil is an extreme case in which presidents have generally been uninterested in party-building; many presidents have even attempted to undermine parties. However, as is usually the case, nonparty candidates must still be endorsed by party leaders.

In some presidential systems, parties have greater control over the candidate selection process and greater penetration in society, so it is more difficult for people to become candidates, much less presidents, if they campaign as anti-party or supra-party politicians. In Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela, presidents have been recruited through party channels and have had strong commitments to their parties, though Ibañez (1946-52) was an exception in Chile. Even so, as Walker (1986) shows, President Allende was an isolated, solitary figure with limited support in his own party. Allende’s isolation and the conflicts between his Socialist Party and the government contributed to the breakdown of democracy in Chile. In Venezuela, in order to become presidential candidates, politicians must have strong ties to their parties, but once elected president, the rule barring immediate reelection leads to some distancing between presidents and their parties (Coppedge 1988). These situations are unlikely in a parliamentary democracy.

The nature of presidential recruitment has a major impact on the extent to which presidents feel strong commitments to promoting party-building (Ceaser 1979). Where presidents are consistently recruited through party channels and have built their political careers through the party organizations, they are ineluctably involved in partisan politics, even when they must simultaneously serve as representatives of the nation as a whole. Conversely, where presidential candidates can secure nominations by appealing directly to the electorate and can win elections despite having tenuous ties to party organizations, their commitments to parties are likely to be diluted. In these cases, a presidential system encourages a personalism inimical to party-building. The expansion of the electronic media has further encouraged such personalism, especially in Brazil, where levels of political information among the electorate are generally extremely low, but where television has a profound penetration even among the poor.

In Brazil, the absence of strong ties between presidential candidates and parties during the nomination process and the subsequent campaigns has shaped the subsequent linkages between presidents in office and parties. Having won office on their own, presidents have been less inclined to attempt to govern with parties and more inclined towards plebiscitarian appeals. As Rose (1981: 316) puts it, “Rootless candidates risk becoming rootless in government.”

Because power in the Brazilian political system is concentrated in the executive branch, executive positions are the chief prizes of the political system. Presidents, state governors, and mayors of the largest cities have enormous powers relative to the respective legislative bodies. For ambitious politicians, serving in the legislature is a means to an end—executive positions—rather than an end in itself. When they are denied the opportunity to run for executive positions, ambitious politicians often switch parties so they can do so on another label; they prefer giving up their party to relinquishing their ambitions for an executive post. This practice has also had disruptive effects on party-building.

The final issue I wish to discuss in the conclusion is the way in which the institutional combination of presidentialism and fragmented multipartism has contributed to the difficulties in creating effective democratic government in Brazil. The combination of presidentialism and multipartism with uncohesive parties has made it unlikely that presidents would enjoy majority support in congress, and presidentialism has made it difficult to resolve the impasses that resulted. From the perspective of presidents, this combination has made alliance-building difficult, complex, and generally unstable. Under Dutra and Kubitschek, Brazilian democracy functioned reasonably well with the combination of presidentialism, multipartism, and weak parties. However, this combination has hindered the creation of effective democratic government, and it proved incapable of handling the radicalization that took place in 1961-64.

Multiparty presidential systems are prone to executive-legislative impasses. This problem stems from two features of such systems: the tendency to produce minority governments and the lack of mechanisms for dealing with governments that face a sizeable opposition majority in congress. Based on the separation-of-powers doctrine, presidential systems *per se* have no such mechanisms for avoiding minority governments.<sup>23</sup> Minority governments are the rule in multiparty presidential democracies, and there are no mechanisms for replacing minority governments until the next presidential or congressional elections. Presidents have a difficult

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<sup>23</sup> In the United States, the electoral college has helped manufacture severe distortions between the percentage of the popular vote a given candidate wins and his percentage of votes in the electoral college. Coupled with single-member districts, the electoral college has had a constrictive effect on the number of parties represented in congress, and has therefore somewhat diminished the proclivity towards minority government. But since 1952 the norm has been for congress and the presidency to be controlled by opposing parties.

time accomplishing their agendas because they lack a stable basis of sufficient support in congress.

The president's party is unlikely to have a majority in the legislature, so pushing through policy measures is apt to be difficult. Immobilism and sharp conflict between the executive and the legislature often result, with potentially deleterious consequences for democratic governance. Protracted conflicts between the legislature and congress can lead to a decision-making paralysis. In well established democracies, such a paralysis may not have enervating effects, but in fledgling democracies, it often does.

Executive-legislature conflict occurs in all democratic regimes, but it is arguably more troublesome in presidential systems. With the fixed electoral timetable and the independence between the legislature and executive, presidential systems have no institutionalized means of resolving such a deadlock (Linz forthcoming). Because presidents and legislatures are elected independently, presidential regimes afford two competing claims to legitimacy, one by the president and the other by congress (Linz forthcoming). The conflicts between these two branches of government over who should be allowed to do what can lead to escalating hostilities. Parliamentary regimes mitigate this problem because the executive does not have a base independent of the legislature. This situation can encourage antagonistic relations between the president and congress rather than the moderation that is conducive to stable democracy.

There are no constitutional mechanisms for replacing a president who has lost most of his or her support in the legislature. A president may even have limited support in congress when he or she assumes office. The president may be incapable of pursuing a coherent course of action because of congressional opposition, but no other actor can resolve the problem playing within democratic rules of the game. In many cases a coup appears to be the only means of getting rid of a president who has lost his or her base of support. Thus, the effort to get rid of one president can destroy the regime.

Even though majority governments are the rule in parliamentary systems, minority governments occur frequently. Strom (1990: 56-92) reported that between 1945 and 1987, 111 of 345 governments in advanced industrial parliamentary democracies were true minority governments. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have had more minority than majority governments. Minority governments garner legislative support by using incentives (political positions, patronage, and policy measures) that are similar to those used in presidential systems. However, there is also a key difference between minority governments in presidential as opposed to parliamentary systems. True minority parliamentary governments lasted an average of fourteen months (Strom 1990: 116). Minority presidential governments, in contrast, must go on regardless of whether they have legislative support, and presidential terms last as long as six years. When legislative support breaks down, parliamentary systems have institutionalized mechanisms for

dealing with the problem; presidential systems do not. A vote of no confidence can topple the government, leading to new elections that may change the balance of power and help resolve the crisis. This provision allows for replacing unpopular or inept executives with less institutional strain. Conversely, if prime ministers are frustrated because of the difficulty of effecting policy in the face of opposition control of the legislature, in most parliamentary systems they can call new elections in an effort to achieve (or expand) a majority. In either case, there are means of changing the government without threatening the regime or allowing a feckless, immobilized government to go haplessly on.

Recent contributions on presidentialism have not sufficiently emphasized how important institutional combinations are. The combination of presidentialism and a fragmented multiparty system is especially unfavorable to effective democratic government. With a fragmented multiparty system, the likelihood of executive-legislative deadlock and of immobilism is particularly high. The president is more apt to feel forced to bypass congress, undermine congress and parties, and engage in the other practices we have examined in the Brazilian case.

This helps explain the paucity of stable multiparty presidential democracies. The United States, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela are the only countries in which presidential democracy has endured for at least twenty-five consecutive years. Among them, only Chile consistently had a multiparty system, though Venezuela also did prior to 1973. Two-party systems are the exception rather than the rule in Latin America, but among the region's more enduring democracies, they are the rule rather than the exception.

Note that I am not reviving the old and dubious argument that two-party systems are generally more favorable to stable democracy than multiparty systems. This issue has been debated at length, and the evidence suggests that with parliamentary government, multiparty systems do not impede the successful functioning of democracy.<sup>24</sup> But in dismissing this older argument, analysts have failed to differentiate between presidential and parliamentary systems. For reasons outlined above, in presidential systems the number of parties does matter.

As Suárez (1982) has argued, presidential systems work best when at least one of two conditions obtains: (1) The president's party has a majority or close to it in congress.<sup>25</sup> (2) The

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<sup>24</sup> Lijphart's contributions were fundamental in this debate. Sartori, who had previously argued that there was a strong tendency for multiparty systems with more than five or six parties to develop powerful centrifugal tendencies, more recently acknowledged that the crucial variable in parliamentary systems is ideological polarization, which can vary independently of number of parties. See Sani and Sartori 1983.

<sup>25</sup> Riggs (1988) makes a similar point. Mijeski (1977: 64) provides support for this assertion in the Costa Rican case, noting that "Bitter fighting has characterized disputes between non-PLN presidents and the PLN-dominated National Assembly." Gillespie (forthcoming) and González (1992) argue that the combination of a multiparty system and presidentialism has proven difficult in Uruguay. In the Brazilian context, Reale (1959), Trigueiro (1959), and Brito (1965) made note of the problems stemming from this combination.



ideological differences between the president and the opposition are not sharp. The first condition can be realized in a two-party system, but is rarely attainable in a true multiparty system. The success of presidentialism in Costa Rica and Venezuela is in part a result of the fact that presidents have often had a majority or close to it in congress. Paradoxically, when this condition obtains, the *raison d'être* of presidential systems—a series of checks and balances—is weakened. The second condition has always obtained in the United States, and has also obtained most of the time in the stable Latin American democracies except for Chile (1932-1973).<sup>26</sup> However, in the current context of crisis and egregious inequalities, it may not obtain in most Latin American countries.

Highlighting the problems of multiparty presidential democracy does not mean that parliamentary systems would necessarily work. In Brazil, given undisciplined parties and extreme fragmentation, parliamentary government would face daunting challenges. Without implementing changes that promoted greater party discipline, parliamentary government would probably not function well. While doubts about the viability of a parliamentary system in Brazil remain, the combination of presidentialism, malleable parties, and a highly fragmented multiparty system has proven increasingly unmanageable.

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<sup>26</sup> The Chilean exceptionalism poses the intriguing question of what made stable presidential democracy possible under conditions (multipartism and polarized polity) that have generally been unfavorable. Scully (1992) shows that the Chilean political system was characterized by limited participation early in this century, and then by strong mechanisms of moderation and compromise that coexisted with ideological polarization.

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TABLE 2

Election Results for the Chamber of Deputies, 1945-1962										
	1945		1950		1954		1958		1962	
	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%	Seats	%
PSD	151	52.8	112	36.8	114	35.0	115	35.3	118	28.9
UDN	77	26.9	81	26.6	74	22.7	70	21.5	91	22.2
PTB	22	7.7	51	16.8	56	17.2	66	20.2	116	28.4
PCB	14	4.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PR	7	2.4	11	3.6	19	5.8	17	5.2	4	0.9
PSP	2	0.7	24	7.9	32	9.8	25	7.7	21	5.1
PPS	4	1.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PL	1	0.3	5	1.7	8	2.5	3	0.9	5	1.2
PDC	2	0.7	2	0.7	2	0.6	7	2.1	20	4.9
UDN/PR	6	2.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PST	-	-	9	3.0	2	0.6	2	0.6	7	1.7
PTN	-	-	5	1.7	6	1.8	7	2.1	11	2.7
PRT	-	-	1	0.3	1	0.3	2	0.6	3	0.7
PSB	-	-	1	0.3	3	0.9	9	2.8	5	1.2
PRP	-	-	2	0.7	3	0.9	3	0.9	5	1.2
no party	-	-	-	-	6	1.8	-	-	-	-
MTR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>286</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>304</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>409</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

TABLE 4

## Election Results for the Chamber of Deputies (Seats), 1986-90

	1986		1990	
	Number	%	Number	%
PMDB	261	53.6	108	21.5
PFL	116	23.8	84	16.7
PDS	32	6.6	42	8.3
PDT	24	4.9	47	9.3
PTB	17	3.5	38	7.6
PT	16	3.3	35	7.0
PL	6	1.2	15	3.0
PDC	6	1.2	22	4.4
PC do B	5	1.0	5	1.0
PCB	3	0.6	3	0.6
PSB	1	0.2	11	2.2
PRN	-	-	40	8.0
PSDB	-	-	37	7.4
PSC	-	-	6	1.2
PRS	-	-	4	0.8
PST	-	-	2	0.4
PTR	-	-	2	0.4
PSD	-	-	1	0.2
PMN	-	-	1	0.2
<b>Totals</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Bolivar Lamounier, ed., *De Geisel a Collor: O Balanço da Transição* (São Paulo: Ed. Sumaré, 1990), p. 189; *Folha de São Paulo*, October 29, 1990.

TABLE 5

## Election Results for the Senate (Seats), 1986-90

	1986		1990	
	Number	%	Number	%
PMDB	38	77.6%	8	29.6
PFL	7	14.3	8	29.6
PDS	2	4.0	2	7.4
PDT	1	2.0	1	3.7
PMB	1	2.0	-	-
PTB	-	-	4	14.8
PRN	-	-	2	7.4
PSDB	-	-	1	3.7
PT	-	-	1	3.7
<b>Totals</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Source: Lamounier 1990: 189; *Folha de São Paulo*, October 29, 1990.

Note: Two-thirds of Senate seats were disputed in 1986 in 23 states, and all three senators were elected for the Federal District.





TABLE 7

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**Party Fragmentation of 25 Democracies, 1945-1973, Compared to Brazil**


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	<b>Mean</b>
<b>Brazil 1990</b>	<b>.884</b>
Finland	.804
Switzerland	.801
Chile	.796
France IV	.790
Netherlands	.787
Israel	.784
<b>Brazil 1950-1962</b>	<b>.774</b>
Denmark	.755
Italy	.721
Ceylon	.716
Finland	.716
Norway	.691
Sweden	.685
Luxembourg	.678
Belgium	.667
Eire (Ireland)	.649
Japan	.645
France V	.620
West Germany	.614
Uruguay	.589
Canada	.574
Australia	.565
Austria	.556
United Kingdom	.512
New Zealand	.494
India	.487
United States	.483
Turkey	.461

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Elections covered: Australia 1946-1972; Austria 1945-1971; Belgium 1946-1971; Brazil 1950-1962; Canada 1945-1972; Ceylon 1952-1970; Chile 1946-1973; Denmark 1945-1973; Eire 1948-1973; Finland 1945-1972; France (Fourth Republic) 1946-1956; France (Fifth Republic) 1958-1973; West Germany 1949-1972; Iceland 1946-1971; India 1951-1971; Israel 1949-1973; Italy 1946-1972; Japan 1946-1972; Luxembourg 1945-1968; the Netherlands 1946-1971; New Zealand 1946-1972; Norway 1945-1973; Sweden 1948-1973; Switzerland 1947-1971; Turkey 1946-1973; United Kingdom 1945-1970; United States 1946-1972; Uruguay 1950-1971.

Source: Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, p. 313; calculated from Tables 2 and 4 above for Brazil.

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TABLE 8

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**Average Seats of Two Largest Parties (percentages) in 24 Democracies,  
1945-1973, Compared to Brazil**

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	<b>% Seats of Two Largest Parties</b>
New Zealand	99
United Kingdom	98
Austria	94
Australia	90
Turkey	89
Uruguay	89
West Germany	85
Canada	85
Eire (Ireland)	79
Belgium	77
Luxembourg	75
Japan	74
India	73
Sweden	69
Italy	68
Iceland	68
Norway	67
Ceylon	65
France	63
Denmark	61
Netherlands	59
<b>Brazil, 1950-62</b>	<b>59</b>
Israel	57
Switzerland	51
Finland	49
<b>Brazil 1990</b>	<b>38</b>

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In Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Israel, Japan, and Sweden, the first two parties changed over time.

Source: Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems*, p. 306; Hippólito, 276-285.

Note: 1945 Brazilian elections are excluded because they were conducted with an electoral system that was significantly different from the one that came into existence in 1950.

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TABLE 10

**Voting by Party on Controversial Constitutional Issues**  
 (% of votes that supported (+) and opposed (-) the winning position)

Issue	PMDB	PFL	PDS	PDT	PTB	PT	Total %	Votes
Popular participation*	+59 -41	+14 -86	+14 -80	+92 -8	+32 -68	+100 -0	+48 -52	(227) (248)
Unrestricted property rights	+66 -34	+15 -85	+12 -88	+92 -8	+32 -68	+100 -0	+51 -49	(248) (236)
Guaranteed job stability	+73 -27	+93 -7	+94 -6	+4 -96	+42 -58	+0 -100	+71 -29	(373) (151)
Exclusive labor representation	+91 -9	+43 -57	+46 -54	+92 -8	+91 -9	+0 -100	+77 -23	(340) (103)
Presidential system	+49 -51	+85 -15	+61 -39	+96 -4	+63 -37	+100 -0	+62 -38	(344) (212)
Five-year presidential mandate (general)	+55 -45	+86 -14	+68 -32	+8 -92	+70 -30	+0 -100	+60** -40	(298) (198)
Economic order	+69 -31	+19 -81	+29 -71	+93 -7	+41 -59	+100 -0	+57 -43	(279) (210)
National monopoly of mineral resources	+80 -20	+40 -60	+36 -64	+100 -0	+89 -11	+100 -0	+73 -27	(343) (126)
Agrarian reform*	+36 -64	+84 -16	+86 -14	+15 -85	+68 -32	+0 -100	+49 -51	(253) (268)
Sarney's mandate (5 years)	+61 -39	+86 -14	+70 -30	+7 -93	+64 -36	+0 -100	+62 -38	(323) (202)
Cancelation of debts for contractors	+64 -36	+66 -34	+72 -28	+94 -6	+80 -20	+0 -100	+64 -36	(286) (163)
Rice Index***	33	58	47	86	41	100	-	-

\* In these cases, the winning position had fewer votes than the losing position, but the latter failed to muster the 280 votes needed for approval.

\*\* Incomplete totals.

\*\*\* Average Rice Index of party cohesion for the eleven roll-call votes shown on this table. The Rice Index is calculated by taking the percentage of party members voting with the majority of the party, subtracting 50%, and dividing by 50%. See Stuart Rice, "Measuring Cohesion in Legislative Groups," in John Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, eds., *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 372-377.

Source: Compiled from information published in the *Folha de São Paulo* on the day following the indicated votes. Those who were absent or abstained are not included in the tabulations.

TABLE 11

<b>Parties with Ministry Positions</b>		
	<b>Parties with Ministry Positions</b>	<b>% of Seats* in Chamber</b>
<b>Dutra Government</b>		
Jan. 1946 to Oct. 1946	PSD, PTB	60.5
Oct. 1946 to April 1950	PSD, UDN, PR	82.1
April 1950 to Jan. 1951	PSD, UDN	79.7
<b>Vargas Government</b>		
Jan. 1951 to Aug. 1954	PSD, PTB, UDN, PSP	88.2
<b>Café Filho Government</b>		
Aug. 1954 to April 1955	UDN, PSD, PR, PTB	83.8
April 1955 to Nov. 1955	UDN, PSD, PDC, PR, PTB	81.3
<b>Nereu Ramos Government</b>		
Nov. 1955 to Jan. 1956	PSD, PTB, PR, PSP	67.8
<b>Kubitschek Government</b>		
Jan. 1956 to Jan. 1961	PSD, PTB, PR, PSP	67.8; 68.4
<b>Quadros Government</b>		
Jan. 1961 to Aug. 1961	UDN, PTB, PSD, PSB, PSP, PR	92.7
<b>Goulart Government</b>		
Sept. 1961 to June 1962	PSD, PTB, UDN, PDC	79.1
June 1962 to July 1962	PSD, PTB, UDN, PDC, PR	84.3
July 1962 to Sept. 1962	PSD, PTB, UDN, PSB	79.8
Sept. 1962 to Jan. 1963	PTB, PSD, PSB	58.3
Jan. 1963 to June 1963	PTB, PSB, PSP, PSD, UDN	85.8
June 1963 to Dec. 1963	PTB, PSD, PDC	62.2
Dec. 1963 to April 1964	PTB, PSD	57.3
<b>Sarney Government</b>		
March 1985	PMDB, PFL, PDS	91.0
<b>Collor Government</b>		
March 1990	PMDB, PFL, PRN	58.2

\* The number of Chamber seats occupied by parties with cabinet positions relative to the total number of Chamber seats.

Source: Hippólito, pp. 293-303.

**Table 12**

<b>President</b>	<b>Presidential Election Coalition</b>	<b>Initial Cabinet Composition*</b>
Dutra	PSD, PTB	PSD(5), PTB (1)
Vargas	PTB, PSP	PSD(5), UDN (1), PTB (1), PSP (1)
Kubitschek	PSD, PTB	PSD (4), PTB (2), PSP (1), PR (1)
Quadros	UDN, PDC, PL, PTN	UDN (3), PTB (3), PSD (1), PSP (1), PR (1), PSB (1)
Collor (first round)	PRN	
Collor (second round)	PRN, PDS, PFL, PTB	

\* The numbers in parentheses refer to the number of cabinet positions allocated to different parties.

Source: Lúcia Hippólito, PSD: De Raposas e Reformistas (Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1985), pp. 293-303; Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.

**TABLE 1**

<b>Results of Presidential Elections</b>				
	Votes	% Valid Votes	% of Seats in Chamber of Presidential Electoral Coalition	% of Seats in Chamber of President's Party
<b>1945</b>				
Eunico Gaspar Dutra, PSD/PTB	3,251,507	55.3%	79.7%	PSD=52.8% (1945)
Eduardo Gomes, UDN	2,039,341	34.7%		
Yeddo Fiuza, PCB	569,918	9.7%		
<b>1950</b>				
Getúlio Vargas, PTB/PSP	3,849,040	48.8%	24.7%	PTB=16.8% (1950)
Eduardo Gomes, UDN	2,342,384	29.7%		
Cristiano Machado, PSD	1,697,193	21.5%		
<b>1955</b>				
Juscelino Kubitschek, PSD/PTB	3,077,411	35.6%	52.2%	PSD=35.0% (1954)
Juarez Távora, PDC/UDN/PL	2,610,462	30.3%		
Adhemar de Barros, PSP	2,222,725	25.8%		
Plínio Salgado	714,379	8.3%		
<b>1960</b>				
Janio Quadros, UDN/PDC/PL/PTN	5,636,623	48.3%	26.6%	UDN=21.5%* (1958)
Henrique Teixeira Lott, PTB/PSD	3,846,825	32.9%		
Adhemar de Barros, PSP	2,195,709	18.8%		

**TABLE 1 (Cont.)**

**1989 First Round**

	Votes	% Valid Votes	% of Seats in Chamber of Presidential Electoral Coalition	% of Seats in Chamber of President's Party
Fernando Collor de Mello, PRN	20,611,011	30.5	6.4%	PRN=8.0% (1990)
Luis Inácio da Silva, PT	11,622,673	17.2		
Leonel Brizola, PDT	11,168,228	16.5		
Mário Covas, PSDB	7,790,392	11.5		
Paulo Maluf, PDS	5,986,575	8.9		
Guilherme Afif Domingos, PL	3,272,462	4.8		
Ulysses Guimaraes, PMDB	3,204,932	4.7		
Roberto Freire, PCB	769,123	1.1		
Aureliano Chaves, PFL	600,838	0.9		
Ronaldo Caiado, PSD	488,846	0.8		
Afonso Camargo, PTB	379,286	0.6		
Others	1,732,283	2.6		

**Second Round**

Fernando Collor de Mello, PRN	35,089,998	53.0		PRN=8.0% (1990)
Luis Inácio da Silva, PT	31,076,364	47.0		

\*Quadros was not a member of any party

Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral



**TABLE 3**

**Senate Election Results (Seats), 1945-1964**

	PSD	UDN	PTB	PCB	PPS	UDN/PR	PR	PSP	PPB	PSB	PST	PL	No Party	PTN	PDC	MTR	Total
1945	61.9 (26)	23.8 (10)	4.8 (2)	2.4 (1)	2.4 (1)	4.8 (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100% (42)
1947	54.2 (13)	25.0 (6)	4.2 (1)	-	-	-	4.2 (1)	4.2 (1)	8.3 (2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100% (24)
1950	27.3 (6)	18.2 (4)	22.7 (5)	-	-	-	9.1 (2)	13.6 (3)	-	4.5 (1)	4.5 (1)	-	-	-	-	-	100% (22)
1954	38.1 (16)	21.4 (9)	28.6 (12)	-	-	-	2.4 (1)	2.4 (1)	-	-	-	4.8 (2)	2.4 (1)	-	-	-	100% (42)
1958	28.6 (6)	38.1 (8)	28.6 (6)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.8 (1)	-	-	-	-	100% (21)
1962	35.6 (16)	17.8 (8)	26.7 (12)	-	-	-	2.2 (1)	2.2 (1)	-	2.2 (1)	-	2.2 (1)	2.2 (1)	4.4 (2)	2.2 (1)	2.2 (1)	100% (45)

Note: The 1947 elections were held to increase the number of senators from two to three per state. In the 1950 and 1958 elections, one-third of the seats were renewed. In 1954 and 1962, two-thirds of the seats were disputed.

**TABLE 9**

**Number of Civilian Ministers per Administration, 1946-1964**

	Ministry								Av. Tenure of Ministers (In Months)
	Justice	Foreign Relations	Finance	Transportation and Public Works	Agriculture	Education	Labor	Health	
Dutra, 1/46 to 1/51	4	3	3	3	3	3	5	-	17.5
Vargas, 1/51 to 8/54	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	2*	17.2
Café Filho, 8/54 to 11/55**	3	1	2	3	2	1	1	1	8.6
Kubitschek, 1/56 to 1/61	4	2	3	2	3	3	5	2	20.0
Quadros, 1/61 to 8/61	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	7.0
Goulart, 9/61 to 4/64	5	5	5	3	4	6	6	5	6.4

\* The Ministry of Health was created in December 1953.

\*\* Nereu Ramos was interim president from November 1955 to January 1956.

Source: *Enciclopédia Mirador Internacional* (São Paulo: Encyclopédeia Britannica do Brasil, 1987), Vol. 14, pp. 7718-7742.